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Interest Analysis and Conflicts Between
Statutes of Limitation
By GARY L. MILHoLLIN*
On September 12, 1960 the William S. Merrell Company applied
for permission to market its new drug, thalidomide, in the United
States. Merrell extolled the pill's qualities as a somnifer, and promoted
it heavily. The drug was already on the market in Canada, England,
and Germany, and little difficulty was expected here. Less than one
month after filing its U.S. application, Merrell began to arrange for
shipments of 1,500 bottles of the tablets for testing in teaching hospitals
in the United States.1
Of course thalidomide was never marketed in the United States. It
was tested very widely, however, before the news from Europe caused
Merrell to withdraw its United States application. Altogether, the United
States testing program distributed pills to 1,248 physicians who treated
15,904 patients. Of these, 3,272 were American women of childbearing
age. Fortunately, few American infants were damaged by the testing
program before its abrupt end, but citizens of other countries were not
so fortunate. In Canada, the victims of thalidomide are beginning now
to enter their teens, a time when the enormous burden of the children's
handicaps will begin to shift from the parents to the children themselves.
This article will study the conflict of laws issue raised in the case of
one of these children, Denis Henry, who sued Merrell in a United States
court after his local statute of limitations had run. The discussion will
* B.S., 1961, Purdue University; J.D., 1965, Georgetown University. Associate
Professor of Law, Catholic University of America; Member, District of Columbia Bar.
1. In an internal memorandum, a Merrell executive expressed the following opin-
ion: "we shall not only hasten to produce tablets for the above [testing] program, but
we also might as well get underway with our own production since we have sufficient
raw material for 15 million tablets .... I do not feel ... that we should wait for
final approval of our New Drug Application for the initiation of tablet production." In.
terdepartmental Memo of 10 October 1960, exhibit BB to Supplemental Affidavit of Ar-
thur G. Raynes, in Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1192 (D.NJ. 1973),
rev'd, 508 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1975).
begin with a analysis of statutes of limitations generally and then
examine the complications which borrowing statutes pose.
Quebec, where Denis Henry was born, has a 1-year statute of
limitations on personal injury actions,2 and the statute runs against
minors.' A year expired before Denis's parents had recovered sufficient-
ly from Denis's birth to think of bringing suit against anyone.4 Also at
that time, Quebec prohibited its attorneys from making contingent fee
arrangements. Since Denis's father brought home only $100 per week,
the Henrys could not have retained a lawyer even if they had thought of
doing so in time. These barriers in Quebec law were formidable, but the
Henrys faced still another disability: the Quebec limitation was "pre-
scriptive," which means that when the statute had run, it absolutely
extinguished the obligation, cutting off the right as well as the remedy.'
The Henry case posed the question whether Denis Henry could recover
compensation in a foreign forum whose statute of limitation had not
run.
A federal diversity court sitting in New Jersey applied governmen-
tal interest analysis and found that New Jersey policy would be ad-
vanced by applying New Jersey's longer period to the case.6 On appeal,
the Third Circuit accepted interest analysis as the correct approach but
reversed because it disagreed with the manner in which the district court
had applied it to the facts.7 The reasoning these courts used contradicts
the conventional rule of choice of law for limitations, and probably
would have astonished even the scholars who have long criticized the
conventional rule. This article will discuss the conventional rule and its
critics, will comment upon the Henry holdings, and will present some
proposed rules of decision which reflect the new law.
The Conventional Doctrine
American courts have generally decided conflicts between statutes
2. QUEBEC Crv. CODE art. 2262 (1972).
3. Id. art. 2269.
4. "After the first couple of years, when Denis' operations started and when the
government began to help us through 'Operation Thalidomide,' we thought of possibly
bringing suit for Denis, but we could not, because only people of wealth can pay for
a law suit in Quebec." Affidavit of Lorraine Henry, 14 June 1973, in Henry v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1192 (D.N.J. 1973).
5. "In all the cases mentioned [including suits by minors for personal injuries]
the debt is absolutely extinguished and no action can be maintained after the delay for
prescription has expired." QUEBEC Cry. CODE art. 2267 (1972).
6. Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1192 (D.N.J. 1973).
7. Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1975).
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of limitation according to the distinction between "substance" and "pro-
cedure." The statute of limitations, according to one theory, was a bar
only to the remedy: a plaintiff could enforce the right, which continued
to exist, elsewhere if a remedy could be found.' This theory assumed
that the law of the jurisiction which created the substantive right did not
destroy that right by virtue of its statute of limitations; the statute was
intended merely to deny a remedy in its courts after a certain time had
passed. Thus, the right itself continued and could be enforced wherever
a remedy was still available. On the other hand, the theory also assumed
that since the forum always applied its own procedure to cases brought
in its courts, the forum's period would be applied even to cases in which
the "substantive" rights were created by the law of some other state.9
In its purest form, this approach ignored the question whether the
foreign period was longer or shorter than the one at the forum. Thus, a
tort plaintiff barred by the period in effect at the place of injury-the
choice of law reference for questions of "substance" under the conven-
tional theory-could go looking for a forum with a longer period and
sue there if the defendant could be served.' If the period at the
defendant's residence had run, however, the plaintiff would be barred
there, even though the action remained alive at the place of injury."
As a corollary to the right/remedy distinction, the courts chose not
to apply the forum's longer period when the shorter period imposed by
the locus of the wrong also limited the "right" itself. If, in addition to
barring the remedy, the locus law extinguished the right after a certain
lapse of time, then the- plaintiff had nothing left to enforce elsewhere,
even though some other state's longer period might afford an opportuni-
ty for suit. When the law of the locus extinguished the right as well as
the remedy, the locus's limitation was deemed "substantive" and was
imported by the forum along with the other substantive rules of the
locus. The best known formulation of this corollary is found in The
Harrisburg,'2 an admiralty case in which recovery was based upon state
8. See, e.g., McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet. 312) (1839); A. DE CER-
VERA, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN AMERICAN CoNFLCTS oF LAWS § 1 (1966); R.
LERnAi, AMERICAN CONFLICrS LAw § 127 (rev. ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
LEFLm]; Lorenzen, The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 YALE L.J
492 (1919) [hereinafter cited as Lorenzen].
9. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLIcr OF LAws §§ 585, 604 (1934).
10. See id. § 604; DE CERvERA, THE STATUTE OF LrMITATONS IN A bmwUcAN CON-
FLICTS OF LAW § 3; Lorenzen, supra note 8, at 495. For a more recent case applying
the longer statute of the forum, see Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152
(2d Cir. 1955).
11. See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
12. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
THB HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
statutes giving a right of action for wrongful death. These same statutes
contained limitations of one year upon the time for bringing suit. The
Supreme Court held:
[T]he time within which the suit must be brought operates as a
limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy
alone. . . .The liability and the remedy are created by the same
statutes, and the liability and the remedy are, therefore, to be
treated as limitations of the right.'8
Thus it was error to apply the forum's longer period. Because of the
position taken in The Harrisburg and similar cases, the courts have
found it necessary to devise a method for distinguishing those limitation
periods which extinguish the "right" from those which bar only the
"remedy." The Court did not decide The Harrisburg on constitutional
grounds, so the decision did not bind the states to the Harrisburg
analysis.
Courts have proposed several tests for separating "substantive"
statutes of limitation from "procedural" ones. In The Harrisburg itself,
the Court emphasized the fact that actions for wrongful death were
purely statutory, unknown to the common law, and so when the legisla-
ture created this new right it must have intended for it to be limited by
the time for suit specially provided in the enactment. This rationale was
referred to as the "same statute" test. In Davis v. Mills, 4 however, the
Supreme Court noted that it was not essential that the limitation be in
the same enactment; it could be in a different one so long as the
limitation "was directed to the newly created liability so specifically as to
warrant saying that it qualified the right."' 5 This variation became
known as the "specificity" test. In Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique,16 the court proposed that the foreign limita-
tion be examined to see whether it possessed characteristics which,
under forum law, would make it "procedural." If, for example, under
13. ld. at 214.
14. 194 U.S. 451 (1904).
15. Id. at 454.
16. 43 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1930). See also Noe v. United States Fidelity and
Guar. Co., 406 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1966), in which the Missouri court held that a Louisi-
ana direct action statute, which included venue provisions naming certain parishes in
Louisiana as places where the action was to be brought, was procedural in the sense
that a person injured in Louisiana by a Louisiana insured could not sue the insured di-
rectly in Missouri. The approach in Wood & Selick received a boost when the Fifth
Circuit adopted it to decide Ramsay v. Boeing Co., 432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970). The
opinion has been criticized in Comment, A Foreign Statute of Limitations Possessing
Attributes Characterized as Substantive Will Bar An Action at the Forum if Barred by
the Otherwise Applicable Law of the Foreign Jurisdiction, 37 J. Am L & COMM. 235
(1971).
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foreign law the defendant waived the limitation by failing to plead it,
and if the forum law considered such waivers as procedural, then the
limitation was procedural. If the limitation could not be waived under
foreign law, and if the forum considered nonwaivable defenses as sub-
stantive, then it was substantive. Finally, in Goodwin v. Townsend,"' the
court declared the test to be whether the limitation was considered pro-
cedural solely according to the courts of the foreign state. All these tests
were evaluated in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co.,' 8 in which the
court chose the "specificity" test of Davis v. Mills and held that a
Panamanian seaman could recover against a Panamanian shipowner
under the Panama Labor Code, even though the "non-specific" time
limitation of Panama had expired.
In the journals, an avalanche of criticism has greeted the substance-
procedure distinction. Professor Lorenzen's view is the most venerable
of along line:
There is no reason, as regards statutes of limitation. . . why the
internal test, which classifies them as procedural or as relating to
the remedy, should be carried over into the conflict of laws. A
right which can be enforced no longer by an action at law is shorn
of its most valuable attribute. After the enforcement of the right
of action is gone under the law governing the rights of the parties,
it would seem clear upon principle that the same consequences
should attach to the operative facts everywhere . . . . It follows
that no court should enforce a foreign cause of action which is
barred by the law governing the substantive rights of the parties.19
Thus, when the period at the place of injury bars the tort plaintiff's
claim, he may not sue anywhere. According to Lorenzen it does not
follow that if the period at the place of injury has not run, the plaintiff is
not barred elsewhere. If the shorter period at the forum has expired, the
action will also be precluded:
The question affects not merely the parties to the litigation but the
interests of the [forum] state as a whole. It relates directly to the
administration of justice in the state. . . . The period prescribed
by the [forum] statute of limitations itself defines the maximum
time within which, in the estimation of the legislature of that state,
substantial justice can be done in the particular case .... [I]t
follows as a matter of course that the maximum period prescribed
[by the forum] must apply to all causes of action, irrespective of
the place where they may have arisen.20
The result under Lorenzen's view would thus be to bar any plaintiff who
17. 197 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1952).
18. 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
19. Lorenzen, supra note 8, at 496.
20. Id. at 497-98.
sues after the expiration of either the period at the locus or the period at
the forum. Most conflicts scholars, unlike most courts, have retained this
basic critical position up to the present time. Professor Cook, for exam-
ple, has suggested that the forum court should borrow the foreign
procedural rule whenever it can do so without "inconveniencing" itself
by taking over too much foreign enforcement machinery.2' Professor
Sedler would have the court adopt the "outcome" test laid down for
federal diversity cases in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,22 so that the
foreign procedural rule would apply whenever it would affect the re-
sult.2" In effect these scholars would treat the statute of limitations as
21. "In determining the legal consequences of certain conduct or events it has
seemed reasonable to apply foreign substantive law because of some factual connection
of the situation with the foreign state; but on the other hand it would obviously be quite
inconvenient for the court of the forum, though not unfair to the litigants concerned,
to take over all the machinery of the foreign court for the 'enforcement,' as we say,
of the 'substantive rights.' If we admit that the 'substantive' shades off by imperceptible
degrees into the 'procedure,' and that the 'line' between them does not 'exist,' to be dis-
covered merely by logic and analysis, but is rather to be drawn so as to best carry out
our purpose, we see that our problem resolves itself eventually into this: How far can
the court of the forum go in applying the rules taken from the foreign system of law
without unduly hindering or inconveniencing itself?
"Against the inconvenience involved in learning the foreign rule is the fact that
so closely are 'procedure' and 'substance' connected that in many cases a refusal to ac-
cept the foreign rule as to a matter of falling into the doubtful class will defeat the
policy involved in following the foreign substantive law." Cook, "Substance" and "Pro-
cedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 343-44, in W. CooE, LOorcAL AND
LEGAL BASES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 154, 166 (1942).
If Professor Cook's argument is applied to the statute of limitations, it is clear that
the foreign period would be characterized as "substantive," since it is convenient to as-
certain. Of course, the more basic point is that the distinction between substance and
procedure should be used in conflicts theory only after determination of the purpose to
be served by such a distinction.
22. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
23. Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance and Procedure in the
Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 813 (1962). Professor Sedler asks: "Are statutes
of limitation 'procedural' for conflicts purposes because they destroy only the remedy
and not the right? Or do they destroy only the remedy and not the right because they
are procedural for conflicts purposes?" Id. at 846. When the Supreme Court adopted
the "outcome" test in Guaranty Trust, it took pains to reject the "substance-procedure"
method for dealing with the statute of limitations: "it is ...immaterial whether stat-
utes of limitation are characterized as 'substantive' or 'procedural' in State court opinions
in any use of those terms unrelated to the specific issue before us . . . . mhe intent
of [the Erie] decision was to insure that ... the outcome of the litigation in the federal
court should be substantially the same ... as it would be if tried in a State court."
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
Since the policy of preventing forum shopping between state and federal courts is
analogous to the conflicts objective of preventing it among state courts, it follows that
the shorter term of the locus should apply because it determines the outcome. It is im-
portant to note, however, that since deciding Guaranty Trust the Supreme Court has
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"substantive" for choice of law. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws
Second rejects outright the substance-procedure distinction in its com-
ments, -4 but in the "black letter" portion the Restatement Second still
follows the older doctrine. The forum may apply its own longer period
when the action is barred at the locus,25 with an exception, still follow-
ing the old corollary, in favor of the locus period when it is "substan-
tive." 20
How would Denis Henry fare under the older doctrine, and would
he fare any better under the rule advocated by scholars? Under the older
doctrine he could bring an action in any state in which the period had
not run, the statue of limitations being "procedural," unless the statute
at the locus were deemed "substantive." Since the Quebec statute was
found to be "substantive," he would be barred everywhere under the
older rule. The result would be the same under the Restatement Second.
Under the rule generally advocated by scholars, he would be barred
because the "substantive" tort liability is furnished by the law of
Quebec, and "no court should enforce a foreign cause of action which
is barred by the law governing the substantive rights of the parties. 2 7
The Modern Approach
The reasoning behind the Henry case is an example of the new
moved away from the "outcome" test. See Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965);
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). Moreover, in
Guaranty Trust itself, the Court required the federal diversity judge to apply the period
of the forum rather than that of the state creating the "substantive" cause of action.
24. "These characterizations, [of something as either substantive or procedural]
while harmless in themselves, have led some courts into unthinking adherence to prece-
dents that have classified a given issue as 'procedural' or 'substantive,' regardless of what
purposes were involved in the earlier classifications.. . . To avoid encouraging error
of that sort, the rules stated in this Chapter do not attempt to classify issues as 'proce-
dural' or 'substantive'. Instead, they face directly the question whether the forum's rule
should be applied." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122, comment
b at 352 (1969).
25. "An action will be maintained if it is not barred by the statute of limitations
of the forum, even though it would be barred by the statute of limitations of another
state except as stated in § 143." Id. § 142(2). The only justification given is that
"each state determines for itself when a claim becomes stale." Id. comment g at 397.
26. "An action will not be entertained in another state if it is barred in the state
of the otherwise applicable law by a statute of limitations which bars the right and not
merely the remedy." Id. § 143. The principal rationale for this section is that section
142(2), quoted in note 25 supra, has been criticized. "Dissatisfaction . . . has been
felt with that part of the rule [§ 142(2)] which permits maintenance of an action that
is barred by the statute of limitations of the state of otherwise applicable law but is
not barred by the statute of limitations of the forum." Id. § 143 comment a at 400.
27. Lorenzen, supra note 8, at 496-97.
approach. In Henry, the federal diversity court sitting in New Jersey
faced a New Jersey precedent rejecting the older rule and adopting the
scholars' approach. Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc.2" had held that New
Jersey would not apply its own longer period to a claim for personal
injuries barred under the shorter period of North Carolina, the place of
injury. A defective tire purchased in North Carolina by the North
Carolina plaintiff had blown out and caused the plaintiff's truck to crash
into an abutment. The Uniroyal court held that since New Jersey had
"no substantial interest in the matter," and since all parties were amena-
ble to the jurisdiction of North Carolina, New Jersey would hold the suit
barred because North Carolina would bar it also. 29 Thus, the court
broke with the older rule and treated the statute of limitations as
"substantive," importing the locus period into forum law just as it would
import the other "substantive" provisions of locus law.
In Henry, it was necessary to apply this precedent in the context of
interest analysis,"0 which was New Jersey's choice-of-law technique for
28. 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973).
29. id. at 140-41, 305 A.2d at 418.
30. One of the best short descriptions of interest analysis is the following:
"1. Normally, even in cases involving foreign elements, the court should be ex-
pected, as a matter of course, to apply the rule of decision found in the law of the
forum.
"2. When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state should furnish the rule
of decision, the court should, first of all, determine the governmental policy expressed
in the law of the forum. It should then inquire whether the relation of the forum to
the case is such as to provide a legitimate basis for the assertion of an interest in the
application of that policy. This process is essentially the familiar one of construction
or interpretation. Just as we determine by that process how a statute applies in time,
and how it applied to marginal domestic situations, so we may determine how it should
be applied to cases involving foreign elements in order to effectuate the legislative pur-
pose.
"3. If necessary, the court should similarly determine the policy expressed by the
foreign law, and whether the foreign state has an interest in the application of its policy.
"4. If the court finds that the forum state has no interest in the application of
it. policy, but that the foreign state has, it should apply the foreign law.
"5. If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the application of
its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even though the foreign state also has
an interest in the application of its contrary policy, and, a fortiori, it should apply the
law of the forum if the foreign state has no such interest." Currie, Notes on Methods
and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 178 in B. CuRm, SE-
LECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 177, 183-84 (1963). New Jersey's brand of in-
terest analysis is set out principally in three cases: Rose v. Port of New York Author-
ity, 61 N.J. 129, 293 A.2d 371 (1972); Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263
A.2d 129 (1970); Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967). The cases
and their methodology are discussed in Note, Conflict of Laws-The Application in
New Jersey of the Governmental Interest Analysis Approach to Choice of Law Prob-
lems of Tort Liability, 3 RUTGERs (CAmDEN) LJ. 165 (1971).
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deciding "substantive" questions in tort cases. If New Jersey's contacts
with the transaction were such that, by holding the defendant, the court
would advance a New Jersey policy, then New Jersey would apply its
own law rather than looking mechanically to the law of the place of
injury. The Third Circuit found that New Jersey's longer period con-
tained two policies: deterrence of wrongful acts, and compensation of
persons injured by such acts. The court held that enforcing the plain-
tiff's claim would not promote the policy of deterrence because Merrell
made the decision to manufacture, test, and distribute thalidomide in
Ohio, not New Jersey.3 Enforcing the claim would not advance the
second policy, compensation, because the court assumed the limitation
was designed for the benefit of plaintiffs from New Jersey, not
Quebec. 2  Barring the claim would advance Quebec's interests be-
cause Quebec's shorter period expressed policies of respose for the
benefit of defendants, such as Richardson-Merrell, doing business in
Quebec=3 and of judicial economy by discouraging stale claims (but
that court-protecting policy was irrelevant because the case was not be-
fore a Quebec court). Thus the court applied Quebec law in order to
advance the policy of the only interested state.
Later in this article I will argue that the Third Circuit erred in its
assessment of New Jersey's deterrence policy. At this point, however, we
need simply note that the analysis in Henry differs radically from the
traditional rule. The reasoning of Henry, when combined with that of
Uniroyal, completely upsets the older doctrine. First, by treating the
statute of limitations as "substantive," the court denies the forum's
longer period to a plaintiff whose recovery is not required by any
"substantive" policy of the forum. Second, the corollary of the older
doctrine, the "specificity" test of Davis v. Mills, is set on its head since
the court ignores even "substantive" periods at the place of injury
whenever the "substantive" interests of the forum are advanced by
applying the longer forum period.34 Third, the decision casts an entirely
new light on the scholarly criticism urging "substantive?' treatment for
the statute of limitations. When the scholars argued that the forum
should always apply the period of the state whose substantive law creates
the right, they hardly could have anticipated that under interest analysis
31. Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1975).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 38.
34. The district court held that the question whether Quebee's period was "sub-
stantive" was "no longer a particularly relevant consideration in resolving the statute
of limitations issue . . . ." Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1192,
1197-98 (D.N.J. 1973).
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the policy expressed by the forum's longer period, that of deterrence or
compensation, might be defeated by applying the shorter period of
another state; they could not have foreseen that states other than that of
the locus of injury could also find their "substantive" interests advanced
by applying their longer local periods. Of course, this result is hardly a
reason for faulting the scholars, since their work pointed the direction
toward interest analysis before anyone realized the full implications of
that approach.
Under the reasoning of Henry, neither the older rule, nor its
corollary, nor the Restatement Second is any longer the law in New
Jersey. Henry and the cases like it will ultimately obliterate the distinc-
tion between substance and procedure in choice of law. More specifical-
ly, the effect of Henry is to show that interest analysis and the distinction
between substance and procedure are fundamentally irreconcilable.
Before examining other recent cases, it would be well to set out the
specific methodology by which one might apply interest analysis to the
statute of limitations. As the Henry court noted, two basic policies are
thought to underlie statutes of limitation: repose for defendants and
judicial economy. Regarding the first, it is thought unfair to ask defend-
ants to respond to claims beyond a certain time because evidence and
witnesses may have disappeared and because the lingering fear of belat-
ed judgments imposes too great a restraint on business. Regarding the
second policy, the assumption is that by limiting its docket to the more
current disputes, the court encourages plaintiffs to act promptly, avoids
the burden of weighing stale evidence, and shifts the judiciary's efforts
to matters of greater urgency.
35
Given these policies, it follows, according to interest analysis, that
applying the foreign state's shorter period would advance the foreign
state's policy of repose whenever that period appears designed to benefit
the defendant at bar (when, for example, the defendant is a resident of
the foreign state). When the defendant is not a resident of that foreign
state and when there is no other connection between the defendant and
that state sufficient to warrant applying the foreign period to him, the
court should not apply the foreign state's shorter period because no
policy of the foreign state would be advanced by doing so. In like
manner, applying the forum's shorter period would advance the forum's
35. "New Jersey's statute of limitations policy is somewhat similar to that of Que-
bec. [I]t . . . is chiefly designed to penalize dilatoriness, stimulate litigants to prose-
cute causes of action diligently, and spare the courts and citizens of this State from liti-
gating stale claims." Id. at 1202. See also Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and
Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 33 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Ester].
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policy of repose whenever the defendant by his residence, domicile, or
other connection with the case was intended to benefit from that forum
policy.
The policy of economy of judicial effort would be advanced by
applying the forum's shorter period to any action brought in a forum
court simply because of the forum's interest in its own judicial adminis-
tration."' Accordingly, this policy could never be advanced by applying
a shorter foreign period because the case, by definition, is not in a
foreign court.
Statutes of limitation also express, by negative implication, a policy
of protecting plaintiffs. The exact point in time at which an action is
barred represents a compromise between the desire to protect the de-
fendant and the judiciary and the desire to afford the plaintiff a reasona-
ble time in which to bring an action. 7 In New Jersey, for example, the
regular period for personal injuries was tolled for the benefit of mi-
nors.38 This provision is a clear example of a policy designed specifically
to benefit plaintiffs. Another is the tolling which commonly occurs
during the defendant's absence from the state.
It would follow from this plaintiff-protecting policy that whenever
it appears that the forum's longer period was designed to benefit the
plaintiff at bar, the forum should advance its policy by applying its own
law. If the foreign period is the longer, and if the plaintiff at bar resides
in the foreign state, the plaintiff-protecting policy of the foreign state
can also be advanced by applying its longer period. A forum can never
apply a longer foreign period, however, without defeating the policy of
judicial economy expressed by the shorter period at the forum. Whether
the longer period of either state is designed to benefit the plaintiff at bar
depends, of course, upon the connection between the respective states
and the transaction, and between the respective states and the plaintiff.
As these policies are applied to particular cases, the result would
appear to depend upon the governmental interests generated by the
36. See Schenk v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 377 F. Supp. 477, 480 (W.D. Pa. 1974):
"While we would agree that the significant contacts of this cause of action with Pennsyl-
vania are minimal, being solely the domicile of the defendant corporation, nevertheless
Pennsylvania has a valid public interest in the administration of its judicial system suffi-
cient to support a separate conflict of laws rule on the applicable statute of limitations
on actions brought under foreign law."
37. See Peterson v. Roloff, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 203 N.W.2d 699, 702 (1973): 'Two
conflicting policies confront each other when statutes of limitation are presented: (1)
that of discouraging stale and fraudulent claims, and (2) that of allowing meritorious
claimants, who have been as diligent as possible, an opportunity to seek redress for in-
juries sustained."
38. NJ. STAT. AN. 2A: 14-21 (1951).
particular facts and parties at bar. A "false conflict" would exist, for
example, if both parties resided in the forum in a case in which the
injury occurred in another state and the forum's period was longer. The
plaintiff-protecting policy of the forum's longer period could be ad-
vanced without impairing any interest of the foreign state since the
defendant did not reside in the foreign state. If the defendant did reside
in the foreign state, however, a "true conflict" would arise because the
forum could not advance its policy of protecting the local plaintiff
without frustrating the foreign state's policy of granting repose to its
defendant.3 9 One would then expect the forum either to weigh the
competing interests, or to apply its own law. 0
The foregoing is a general statement of what should be a court's
approach according to interest analysis. To what extent have the courts
begun to use it?
Baldwin v. Brown,4 decided in 1962, is one of the earliest cases
applying interest analysis to a conflicts problem involving the statute of
limitations. In Baldwin, one Michigan citizen injured another in Ontar-
io. The Michigan court refused to apply the shorter Ontario period:
The purposes of statutes of limitations are, at most, to protect courts
and defendants. The Ontario legislature can claim no interest in
protecting Michigan courts against imposition nor any interest in
protecting Michigan defendants against stale claims. Hence, there
is no good reason for allowing the time in which the action may
be brought to be governed by Ontario law. . . . Michigan, as the
forum state and as the residence of defendant, has declared a
policy regarding limitations of actions in its limitations statute.
There is no good reason that this policy should be made to give
way to the differing view of any other state or country in a situation
such as this.42
39. There is a "true conflict" in the sense that it is not possible to advance the
governmental policy of one state without defeating that of the other. See Currie, Mar-
ried Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. Cm. L. REv.
227 (1958), in B. CURIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 77 (1963).
See also R. WEINTRAtB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 39 (1971) [herein-
after cited as WEINTRAUB].
40. "[W]here several states have different policies, and also legitimate interests
in the application of their policies, a court is in no position to 'weigh' the competing
interests, or evaluate their relative merits, and choose between them accordingly ....
A court need never hold the interest of the foreign state inferior; it can simply apply
its own law as such." Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of
Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 176 in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS
177, 181-82 (1963).
41. 202 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
42. Id. at 51 (citation omitted).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 27
September 1975J INTEREST ANALYSIS AND STATUTES OF LIMITATION 13
The court in Baldwin made a clear move to advance the plaintiff-
protecting policy of its own longer statute and found that it could do so
without impairing any policy of the foreign state because that state's
shorter period was not intended to benefit the defendant at bar. Finding
a "false conflict," the court abandoned the traditional approach and
applied the law of the only interested state.
In 1965 the Seventh Circuit decided Gianni v. Fort Wayne Air
Service, Inc.,43 simply basing the decision on the reasoning given in a
companion case, Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co.,44 which involved a conflict
in the measure of damages for wrongful death. Both cases applied
Indiana law. In Watts, an Indiana citizen wrongfully killed a Kentucky
resident in Illinois, and the surviving beneficiaries, also Indiana citizens,
sued in Indiana. The Indiana wrongful death act apportioned damages
according to the degree of dependence of the beneficiaries on the
deceased; this method of calculation would have resulted in a smaller
recovery than the rule in Illinois permitted. The court ignored the law of
the locus and applied forum law:
The five potential beneficiaries as well as the two defendants are
all residents of Indiana. If the Illinois statute applies, the Indiana
requirement of dependence as a prerequisite for recovery in a
wrongful death situation would be circumvented by the fortuitous
occurrence of the accident in Illinois. That state does not have a
sufficiently substantial interest in the recovery of damages by
Indiana beneficiaries from Indiana defendants. 45
Since the court based the result in Gianni on the same reasoning, it
has held that interest analysis should be adopted to resolve conflicts
between statutes of limitation as well as conflicts between statutes limit-
ing. damages. Apparently the court found the similarity between these
issues too obvious for comment. Despite a contrary provision of "sub-
stantive" law in effect at the locus, the court in Watts advanced the
forum's defendant-protecting policy by applying a local statute in favor
of a local defendant whom the policy was designed to protect.46
43. 342 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1965).
44. 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965).
45. Id. at 620.
46. The court in Watts assumes, of course, that Illinois has no interest in having
its more plaintiff-protecting measure apply, since no litigant was a resident or citizen
of that state. An important court, however, has just held that the state of injury ex-
presses a deterrent policy when it grants higher damages for wrongful death, and that
this policy is advanced by applying it to all defendants who cause injuries within its
borders. Hurtado v. Superior Ct., 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106
(1974). See also Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Ken
v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1965), a! 'd, 26 App. Div.
2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966). The state of injury may also have an interest in
In Gianni the plaintiff's decedent was killed in an airplane crash in
Massachusetts. The defendant, an Indiana corporation, asked the Indi-
ana court to apply the shorter "substantive" period of Massachusetts;
instead, the court applied the longer period of Indiana. Since the court
in Gianni simply rested its decision on the Watts case, we may work
through the reasoning the court might have used. Clearly the longer
forum period expressed no policy of repose or judicial economy under
these facts since the action was still timely in Indiana. Thus, the court
would have concluded that no local policy barred recovery. No policy of
any foreign state stood in the way, either, since the defendant did not
reside in any foreign state and the case was not in a foreign court. The
question, then was whether recovery had to advance some state's plain-
tiff-protecting policy before the forum would entertain the suit. The
shorter period of Massachusetts, the place of injury, declared no such
policy.
The court could have consulted the period in Connecticut, the
residence of the plaintiff and his decedent. If it were longer, one could
argue that it should be interpreted as favoring compensation of its
residents in the courts of another state for injuries received in yet a third
state. If the issue here, instead of the limitation of time for suit, had been
limitation on damages for wrongful death, the facts in Gianni would
have been the same as those in Reich v. Purcell,47 in which the Califor-
nia court declared that Ohio, the plaintiff's residence, was the state
whose policy would be advanced in a case in which the plaintiffs
decedent was wrongfully killed in Missouri by a California defendant.
Missouri limited damages for wrongful death; Ohio and California did
not. The court in Reich held that Missouri's defendant-protecting policy
was not intended to shield "travelers from states having no similar
protecting its medical creditors, since a higher recovery encourages reimbursement of
those who furnish aid where the harm occurs. However tenuous it may initially sound,
this "medical creditor" interest has been used by the Supreme Court as a basis for up-
holding the right of the injury state to apply its higher level of protection in favor of
nonresident employees. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939). It would seem that the Indi-
ana court in Watts at least should have recognized these Illinois interests. Even if it
had, however, it still could have decided to subordinate them to its own policy of limit-
ing the damages chargeable to the local defendant, especially since the plaintiff was also
a local citizen.
47. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). See also Comments
on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 551 (1968); Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55
N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970). In Pfau, New Jersey ignored a guest statute in the
place of injury, Iowa, and allowed a Connecticut plaintiff to recover from a New Jersey
defendant. Connecticut did not have a guest statute, so there was a false conflict.
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limitation." 8 Gianni and Reich are indistinguishable if the statute of
limitation is really "substantive." Statutes of limitation and limitations
on damages are both part of the total scheme by which a state seeks to
achieve, in tort cases, its policies of compensation and deterrence with-
out placing undue burdens on defendants. Under interest analysis there
is no rational basis for distinguishing these devices except when the
policies they express bear differently on the facts of a given case. On the
facts in Gianni and Reich, the plaintiff-protecting policies apply in the
same way, and it follows that any court following Reich should consider
the Connecticut period when faced with the facts in Gianni.
In Dindo v. Whitney,49 decided in 1970, an automobile crash oc-
curred while the parties were traveling together through Quebec on a
hunting trip to northern Maine. The Vermont plaintiff sued the New
Hampshire defendant in New Hampshire, and the defendant asked the
court to apply Quebec's shorter period because it was "prescriptive."
The court said, "[W]e attach no weight to the fact that under the Quebec
statute plaintiff's cause of action [was] 'extinguished.' "50 The interests
were analyzed as follows:
The parties involved have only the most fortuitous relations to
Quebec. Quebec's only interests underlying its statute of limita-
tions are to protect its own citizens, and possibly its own courts,
from "stale" claims. Application of the Quebec limitation period
here furthers neither Quebec interest, but would frustrate New
Hampshire's interest to some degree, for New Hampshire has said
that its citizens should be suable and its courts open for a period
long enough to permit this plaintiff's claim.51
It is true, of course, that applying Quebec law could advance no
Quebec interest. It does seem odd, however, for the court to conclude
that Quebec has no interest in protecting the defendant because he does
not live in Quebec, and at the same time hold that New Hampshire does
have an interest in protecting the plaintiff who does not live in New
Hampshire. Surely New Hampshire's interest in the Vermont plaintiff is
no greater than Quebec's interest in the New Hampshire defendant. It
would be more logical for the New Hampshire court simply to recognize
Vermont's interest in compensating its own plaintiff. Vermont's period
48. 67 Cal. 2d at 556, 432 P.2d at 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
49. 429 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970). See also Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 294
F. Supp. 1257 (D.N.H. 1969) (when Massachusetts decedent ingested in Massachusetts
a drug prescribed and purchased there, New Hampshire would apply Massachusetts pe-
riod of limitations).
50. 429 F.2d at 26.
51. Id.
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had not yet expired. This method, at least, was the one used by the
California court in Reich.
In 1973 two more courts switched to interest analysis in dealing
with statutes of limitation. Air Products & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks
Morse, Inc.52 was a buyer's suit, in Wisconsin, for breach of warranty
and strict liability against the seller of large electric motors. The plain-
tiff, a Delaware corporation, had its principal place of business in
Pennsylvania; the defendant, also a Delaware corporation, had its prin-
cipal place of business in New York. Under Wisconsin's longer period
the suit was still timely. The shorter Pennsylvania limit had expired.
Although Wisconsin was the place of manufacture, the parties agreed
that all issues other than the statute of limitations would be decided
under Pennsylvania law. Before addressing the limitations issue, the
court looked back over its doctrinal voyage through choice of law. The
court noted that it had first broken with lex loci by adopting "center of
gravity.""5 Then it had "refined" the concept of "center of gravity" by
turning to a list of "choice-influencing considerations. 54 In order to
decide the present case, however, the court turned to interest analysis:
A determination that Wisconsin's six-year statute controls
would in no way affect any legitimate interest of Pennsylvania since
their statute, like ours, is designed to protect defendants and in this
case, Air Products, the Pennsylvania resident, is the plaintiff-not
the defendant. Likewise, Pennsylvania is in no position to in any
way influence what Wisconsin feels to be an appropriate period of
protection for both itself and defendants from stale lawsuits.55
In Farrier v. May Dep't Stores Co.,56 the plaintiff, a California
52. 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
53. Id. at 202, 206 N.W.2d at 418, citing Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133
N.W.2d 408 (1965).
54. The "choice influencing considerations" were listed as follows:
"Predictability of results;
"Maintenance of interstate and international order;
"Simplification of the judicial task;
"Advancement of the forum's governmental interests;
"Application of the better rule of law."
Id. at 202, 206 N.W.2d at 418, quoting Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 596, 151
N.W.2d 664, 672 (1967). See R. LEFLAR, supra note 8, at 245.
55. 58 Wis. 2d at 203-04, 206 N.W.2d at 419. The court also attempted to find
a Wisconsin policy favoring the plaintiff: "Moreover, by the decision of the legislature
to permit aggrieved parties six instead of four years to prosecute their claims, a decision
contrary to the recommended period by drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code
which was ultimately adopted in Pennsylvania, the legislature determined that the inter-
ests of Wisconsin are best advanced by a longer period. We affirm the order sustaining
demurrers to defendants' affirmative defenses on the statute of limitations." Id. at 204,
206 N.W.2d at 419.
56. 357 F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1973).
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citizen residing in Virginia, was injured by a fall while in the defendant's
Virginia store. Virginia's shorter two-year period had expired when the
action was filed in the District of Columbia. It was still timely, however,
under District law. After explaining that the District had adopted inter-
est analysis, 57 the court observed that "[tihere is no reason why the lex
fori rule. . should not similarly be superseded by the interest analysis
doctrine in tort cases where there are conflicts between statutes of
limitations."58 The court's language paralleled that in Air Products
when it analyzed the interests:
The purpose of both the Virginia and District of Columbia
statutes of limitations is to protect domiciliaries from the prosecu-
tion of stale claims .... The District of Columbia has no relation
to the plaintiff, a Virginia resident, and no person or property in
the District of Columbia has been adversely affected by the alleged
act of negligence which occurred in Virginia .... .Thus there is
no interest of the District of Columbia which compels the applica-
tion of its statute. Virginia is the only jurisdiction whose interest
would be served by the application of its laws.5 9
Farrier was followed in 1974 by another District of Columbia case,
Cornwell v. C.I.T. Corp."0 The plaintiff, a Virginia citizen, suffered
injuries while riding in the defendant's airplane when it crashed on
takeoff at Anchorage, Alaska. He brought his action in the District of
Columbia against the airplane owner, the C.I.T. Corporation of New
York, and the operator, a Tennessee corporation. The defendant plead-
ed the two-year periods of Virginia, Alaska, and the Warsaw Conven-
tion. The District's three-year period had not expired. The court said
that "[iln consequence to the abandonment of the outdated notion that
statutes of limitations are 'procedural' in character, the door is now open
in this jurisdiction for a rational consideration of the limitations question
.... ."61 Citing Farrier, the court held that "[t]he District of Columbia
has no relationship to the instant dispute aside from the fact that C.I.T.
57. See Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d
468 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
58. 357 F. Supp. at 191.
.59. Id. It should be noted here that if the accident in Farrier had occurred in
the District, one would expect the District to apply its longer period to advance the Dis-
trict's interest in deterring negligence and compensating medical creditors. See Gaither
v. Meyers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also Hurtado v. Superior Ct., 11 Cal.
3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974); see note 46 supra. It also should
be noted that under the traditional theory, or that of the Restatement Second, Farrier
would have been decided for the plaintiff by a "procedural" characterization of the stat-
ute of limitations. This latter result, of course, would have been wholly irrational be-
cause under the facts the District has no interest whatever in the case.
60. 373 F. Supp. 661 (D.D.C. 1974).
61. Id. at 664.
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has an agent here and, therefore, is subject to service of process."62 It
followed that the court "would only apply the D.C. Statute of Limita-
tions if that was the result called for under the 'interest analysis' formula
of the local conflict of laws rule."63 Other decisions by important courts
seem simply to have assumed that interest analysis would apply to
statutes of limitation. 6
4
Some Tentative Rules
What conclusions can one draw from all these cases? At least, one
can say that a significant number of courts following interest analysis
have rejected any distinction between substance and procedure, and
have found, quite explicitly, that interest analysis provides a satisfactory
means for resolving conflicts between statutes of limitations. Given the
basic premise of interest analysis, that solutions to choice of law prob-
lems can be rational only upon consideration of the relevant governmen-
tal policies, it seems logical to treat conflicts between statutes of limita-
tion the same as conflicts between other rules of law. Courts following
interest analysis"5 should, therefore, be expected to apply it eventually to
statutes of limitation. In those courts which have already done so, a
62. Id. at 665.
63. Id. The court also relied upon language by the District of Columbia hinting
that interest analysis was required for the statute of limitations. See Nyhus v. Travel
Management Corp., 466 F.2d 440, 443 n.l1 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
64. The Ninth Circuit, for example, affirmed the decision in a California diversity
case which held that the shorter forum period barred action by citizens of Missouri
against a California defendant for injuries sustained in a California accident. The court
said that "[ujnder the California significant contacts approach, we find too little Mis-
souri significant contacts and too many in California to apply the Missouri statute."
Horton v. Jessie, 423 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); cf. Cuthbertson v. Uhley,
509 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1975) (Minnesota diversity case applying the shorter forum pe-
riod by rejecting interest analysis). In another California diversity case, the court
granted plaintiff's motion to transfer from a forum whose period had run to a forum
where the action was still timely. The court said the original forum "no longer had
[any] substantial connection" with the case. Les Schwimley Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 418, 421 (E.D. Cal. 1967). In a Kentucky diversity case,
Wisconsin plaintiffs suing an Alabama defendant in Kentucky after Kentucky's period
had expired were granted leave to amend to show that some other state had a "more
significant relationship with the occurrence." Gore v. Debaryshe, 278 F. Supp. 883, 884
(W.D. Ky. 1968). And finally, the appellate division of the Supreme Court of New
York affirmed a recovery for the wrongful death of a New Yorker killed in Massachu-
setts, despite the "specific" period of limitation contained in the Massachusetts act.
Paris v. General Elec. Co., 29 App. Div. 2d 939, 290 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1968) af'g mem.
54 Misc. 2d 310, 282 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
65. There could be a considerable number. For a recent list of the jurisdictions
following interest analysis, see WEINTRAUB, supra note 39, at 234.
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pattern of analysis is emerging which can be identified and even antici-
pated. A set of "rules" might be stated as follows:
(I) If the forum's period is shorter, the forum will apply its own
law.
The reason for this first and simplest of rules is that the forum's
policy of judicial economy considers the claim to be stale. If the defend-
ant was intended to benefit from the forum's policy of repose, there is an
additional reason for applying the forum period. Whenever the longer
foreign period was intended to benefit the plaintiff, there will be a "true
conflict" with the forum's policy of judicial economy and also with the
forum's policy of repose if it was intended to benefit the defendant. In
such cases the forum would have no reason to prefer the foreign state's
policy to its own and should apply its own law.
(11) If the foreign period is shorter, it will be applied whenever
(1) the defendant was intended to benefit from it and
(2) neither the forum's longer period nor any other longer period
was intended to benefit the plaintiff.
This situation presents a "false conflict" in the sense that no policy
of the forum or of any other state really opposes advancing the defend-
ant-protecting policy of the foreign state. An illustration is Farrier v.
May Dep't Stores Co.,66 in which the shorter period of Virginia, the
place of injury, expressed a policy of protecting its resident defendant,
and the longer period of the District of Columbia expressed no policy of
protecting the non-resident plaintiff. A similar result was reached by
similar reasoning in Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc.,67 it follows here that the
policy of the only state with a true interest, the foreign state, should
prevail.
(HI). The shorter foreign period will not be applied whenever it
is not intended to benefit the defendant and the longer forum period is
designed to benefit the plaintiff.
Here also there is a "false conflict," because the forum can advance
its policy of protecting the plaintiff without defeating any defendant-
protecting policy of the foreign state. This situation is illustrated by the
case of Baldwin v. Brown,68 in which the Michigan court applied the
longer Michigan period in behalf of a Michigan plaintiff. The court held
that the shorter period of Ontario, the place of the injury, expressed no
relevant interest because the defendant resided in Michigan. Ontario's
66. 357 F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1973).
67. 63 NJ. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973).
68. 202 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
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only contact was fortuitous and the forum could advance no defendant
or court-protecting policy of Ontario.
Note that this "false conflict" analysis might produce a different
result than would the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contracts"
approach used by the Restatement Second. If one ignores the Restate-
ment's sections on limitations,69 and treats the statute of limitations as
"substantive," one would refer to the "state of the most significant
relationship," which, for a personal injury case, may well be the locus of
injury and negligence.T0 Since in Baldwin the "false conflicts" analysis
would assume a clear forum interest because of the plaintiffs residence
and a total lack of locus interest because of the defendant's residence,
the court would undoubtedly apply forum law. Another point of differ-
ence with the Restatement Second is that under interest analysis it is
irrelevant in a false conflict whether or not the period at the locus of
injury is characterized as "substantive."'" The decision of the locus to
"extinguish" a claim barred by the locus can have little meaning in a
case in which the defendant was not intended to benefit from that
period. Had the issue in Baldwin been a guest statute at the locus or a
locus limit on damages for wrongful death, a Michigan court would not
have hesitated under interest analysis to apply forum law if the defend-
ant was not from the locus and if the plaintiff was from the forum.72 On
69. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142(2) (1969). See notes
25-26 & accompanying text supra.
70. Under the Restatement Second the choice of law reference is to the place of
injury "unless some other state has a more significant relationship .... " RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (1969). One determines this latter point by
referring to the following principles in section 6: "(a) the needs of the interstate and
international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies
of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination
of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of re-
sult, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. Id.
§ 6.
When considered in light of the facts in Baldwin, principle (b) indicates that the
Michigan period should apply, since the forum's interest would be advanced by applying
the forum's longer period in behalf of the local plaintiff. Principle (c) would not sug-
gest the Ontario period, however, because Ontario's policy would not require the protec-
tion of Michigan defendants from Michigan plaintiffs. The other principles are rather
uncertain in application. The only other guide declares: "subject only to rare excep-
tions, the local law of the state where conduct and injury occurred will be applied to
determine whether the actor satisfied minimum standards of acceptable conduct." Id.
§ 145, comment d at 417.
71. Section 143 of the Restatement Second looks to the place of injury when that
state's limitation is "substantive." See note 26 supra.
72. See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64
(1972); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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those issues the absence of a "right" under locus law would have been
irrelevant. It should also be irrelevant whether or not the locus has
"extinguished" a right which it once gave.
(IV) The court will not apply a shorter foreign period whenever
it is not intended to benefit the defendant and some other foreign state
intended its longer period to benefit the plaintiff.
A court would resolve this "false conflict" the same way as the
others. In Dindo v. Whitney,78 where the New Hampshire court al-
lowed a Vermont plaintiff to recover against a New Hampshire defend-
ant for injuries received in Quebec, the court found a "false conflict"
because it could advance Vermont's plaintiff-protecting policy without
defeating any interest of Quebec. If the forum period had expired in
Dindo, the suit would have been barred under Rule I. If the Vermont
period had expired, the conflict would fall under Rule V.
(V) The shorter foreign period may or may not be applied when-
ever:
(a) It is intended to benefit the defendant and the longer period
of the forum or some other foreign state is intended to benefit
the plaintiff, or
(b) It is not intended to benefit the defendant and neither the
longer period at the forum nor that of any other state is
intended to benefit the plaintiff.
In (a) above there is a "true" conflict. When the plaintiff resides in
the forum state, the forum cannot advance its plaintiff-protecting policy
without defeating the foreign state's defendant-protecting policy. If there
is no reason for the forum to sacrifice its own policy, it should apply its
own law. The policy of judicial economy which the shorter foreign
period expresses is irrelevant, of course, because the case is not in a
foreign court. One may argue that when the entire transaction occurs in
the defendant's home state, it would be chauvinistic for the forum to
apply its own law simply because the plaintiff is a forum resident. Of
course, the forum applied its own law every time under the traditional
theory, because limitations were labeled as "procedural." One cannot,
however, justify a chauvinistic result by pointing to its existence under
earlier theories. To use interest analysis, one must decide explicitly
whether domicile alone generates enough forum interest to override the
interest of the locus. If the longer locus period expresses a policy of
repose for defendants domiciled at home, then locus policy is frustrated
73. 429 F.2d 25 (Ist Cir. 1970).
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by allowing suit in the forum after the locus period expires. The policy
of repose, as distinguished from that of judicial economy, would be
relevant wherever the plaintiff sued. Should the forum nevertheless ad-
vance its own policy by applying its own period to its own plaintiffs?
The courts have hesitated when the defendant may have relied upon his
own law in a transaction occurring wholly within his own state. In
Neumeier v. Kuehner,74 a guest statute case involving an Ontario plain-
tiff, the New York court stated, in dictum: "When the driver's conduct
occurred in the state of his domicile and that state does not cast him in
liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable by reason of the
fact that liability would be imposed upon him under the tort law of the
state of the victim's domicile.' '7. In Rosenthal v. Warren,76 however, the
Second Circuit disregarded Massachusetts law in a New York diversity
suit for the wrongful death of a New Yorker who had gone to Massa-
chusetts to be operated upon there by a Massachusetts physician. The
only real contact with New York was the plaintiffs residence. Neverthe-
less, the court predicted that residence would be enough under the New
York decisions .7 It is unknown, of course, whether or not New York
would really go this far; the dictum in Neumeier suggests that it would
not. 7
Are decisions such as Neumeier and Rosenthal, which weigh the
forum interest on issues such as guest statutes and damage limitations,
74. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
75. Id. at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70 quoting Tooker v. Lo-
pez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 585, 249 N.E.2d 394, 404, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 532 (1969); cI. D.
CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 146 (1965).
76. 475 F.2d 438 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1974).
77. This conslusion is doubtful. None of the cases relied upon by the court really
compels its result, and the dictum in Neumeier is contra. The cases relied upon were
Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968); Tooker v.
Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969); Kilberg v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). In Miller, the
court expressly held that no locus interest existed because the defendants had moved
from the locus to the forum while the case was pending. In Tooker, the defendant was
a citizen of the forum, not the locus. And in Kilberg, the plaintiff's decedent had pur-
chased tickets and departed from the forum on a regularly scheduled flight-the crash
of which in the locus was fortuitous. See also Pryor v. Swarner, 445 F.2d 1272 (2nd
Cir. 1971) (New York plaintiff failed to avoid the guest statutes of Ohio and Florida
when he was injured in an Ohio accident allegedly caused by a Florida defendant).
78. But see Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974). In Tur-
cotte, Rhode Island applied its own law of strict liability and damages to a Massachu-
setts auto crash in which a Rhode Island passenger was burned to death. The suit al-
leged negligent placement of the gas tank during manufacture in Michigan. The auto,
which had been sold in Massachusetts to the driver, also a Rhode Island resident, ex-
ploded on impact in a rear-end collision.
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really precedents for a court which weighs conflicting periods of limita-
tion? The answer would seem to be "yes" when the forum's period is the
longer, for then the forum necessarily must assess the plaintiff-protect-
ing policies expressed by the forum's period. A longer time for suit is
simply an ancillary means for advancing the same primary policies of
compensation and deterrence which the forum has declared in its deci-
sions on guest statutes and damage limitations. If the forum's contacts
generate enough forum interest to apply forum law on those issues, the
same should be true for the forum's longer period of limitations.79
A true conflict also exists when neither party resides in the forum
and the transaction occurred elsewhere. In such a case, the "disinterest-
ed" forum must weigh the conflicting policies of the concerned states.
One would expect the forum to be guided by the same considerations-
set forth above-as would apply if one of the parties were a forum
resident.80
Part (b) of Rule V presents a wholly different problem. When the
shorter foreign period is not designed to benefit the defendant and the
79. For similar views concerning borrowing statutes, discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 85-162 infra, see Siegal, Conflict of Laws, 19 SYRAcUsn L REV. 235, 255-
56 (1967); Note, Choice of Law and the New York Borrowing Statute: A Conflict
of Rationales, 35 ALBANY L. Rv. 754 (1971). But see Gegan, Where Does a Personal
Injury Action Accrue Under the New York Borrowing Statute, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. Rnv.
62 (1972).
80. Several weighing tests have been proposed for resolving true conflicts between
rules of law other than limitations. See, e.g., D. CAvERs, TE CHoxen OF LAW PROCESS
114-203 (1965); Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 SUN. L. REv. 1,
18-19 (1963). The variation in judicial approach is illustrated by the following two
cases. In Thomas v. United Air Lines, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 714, 249 N.E.2d 755, 301
N.Y.S.2d 973 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 991 (1969), suit was brought in New York
for the wrongful death in Illinois of passengers from New Jersey, Connecticut, and
Iowa. The New York court refused to apply the Illinois damage limit, quoting with
approval the following language from a recent Illinois case: "The predominant interests
to be served on the issue of damages are those of the states containing the people or
estates which will receive the recoverable damages, if any, for their injuries or their de-
cedent's death." Id. at 724, 249 N.E.2d at 759-60, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 979, quoting Manos
v. Trans World Airlines, 295 F. Supp. 1170, 1173 (N.D. IIl. 1969). In Tramontana
v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), suit
was brought in the District of Columbia against a Brazilian airline for the wrongful
death of a Maryland resident in Brazil. The court, applying the Brazilian damage limit
of $170, assessed the interest of Maryland as follows: "Maryland's only relationship
with the parties or the transaction is that it is appellant's residence, and was that of
the decedent, but its interest in the matter of appellants recovery is not insignificant,
for it is on the citizens of Maryland that the burden of her support, if she is unable
to support herself, is likely to fall." Id. at 473. The court avoided the task of interest
weighing, however, by holding that Maryland would have applied Brazilian law if the
case had been brought in Maryland.
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longer forum period is not designed to benefit the plaintiff, no policy of
either state can be advanced by applying its law. In Cornwell, the
defendants did not reside in Alaska, the place of injury, or in any other
state the court considered, and the period at the plaintiff's residence had
expired. The court apparently thought it appropriate, therefore, to refer
to one of the more general policies of fairness recognized throughout the
legal system, that of protecting expectations. The court refused to apply
the forum's longer period and said that to allow recovery would be
"transparently inequitable, since it has the effect of exposing the defend-
ant to a claim which he was entitled to consider as in repose.""1
Apparently the court believed the defendant had relied upon Alaska
law. The court never considered the possibility of looking to the periods
of the states in which the defendants resided. The method of Reich v.
Purcell2 does not occur to many courts.
Part (b) of this Rule is also illustrated by two additional cases, Air
Products & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc.83 and Gianni v. Fort
Wayne Air Service, Inc.,8 4 which point to a result opposite from the one
reached in Cornwell. In Air Products, as in Cornwell, the defendant, a
New York corporation, did not reside in either Pennsylvania or Wiscon-
sin, the states the court considered, and the shorter period of Pennsyl-
vania, the plaintiff's residence, had run. Hence, application of Pennsyl-
vania's period could not advance its policy because the defendant was
from New York, and application of Wisconsin's longer period could not
advance its policy because the plaintiff was from Pennsylvania. The Wis-
consin court allowed a recovery, however, because it viewed the absence
of any Pennsylvania interest in the defendant as an adequate basis for
applying its own longer period. The court in Gianni also aiowed a re-
covery, denying the defendant who lived in Indiana, the forum, the ben-
efit of the shorter period of Massachusetts, the place of injury, when the
plaintiff was from Connecticut. No Massachusetts policy could be ad-
vanced by applying its longer period to the Indiana defendant, and no
Indiana policy could be advanced by applying its longer period to the
Connecticut plaintiff. In neither Air Products nor Gianni could the court
advance any defendant or plaintiff-protecting policy, but in each case the
court assumed that the forum's longer period would normally apply in
81. Cornwell v. C.I.T. Corp., 373 F. Supp. 661, 665 (D.D.C. 1974); see notes
60-63 & accompanying text supra.
82. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); see notes 47-48 &
accompanying text supra.
83. 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973); see notes 43-48 & accompanying
text supra.
84. 342 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1965); see notes 52-55 & accompanying text supra.
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any case in which the court could find no reason for displacing it. The
court in Cornwell, of course, seemed to make a similar assumption about
the place of injury. It would appear, therefore, that when the courts can
find no policy rationale, they will revert to one of the earlier methods of
decision. Either, as in Air Products and Gianni, the court assumes the
forum law applies unless displaced, or, as in Cornwell, the court as-
sumes the locus law applies unless displaced. These solutions are proba-
bly as good as any in which by definition there can be no better
rationale.
These rules describe what the courts have been doing and predict
what they will do in light of the logical premises of interest analysis.
They have been framed, however, without any attention to "borrowing'
statutes-those popular antidotes to the rule that statutes of limitation
are "procedural." According to a recent study,85 all but twelve of the
fifty states have adopted statutes which, in certain cases, borrow the
shorter period of some other state,86 and consequently most conflicts
between periods of limitation cannot be resolved without confronting a
borrowing statute. Perhaps the rules developed above for solving con-
flicts in the absence of these statutes will help courts decide how to apply
these statutes to cases which they govern.
Borrowing Statutes
The actual effect of most borrowing statutes has been to com-
pound, rather than simplify, the choice of law problem. This result is
surprising because the policies underlying these statutes are well defined
and generally accepted. The courts, however, in interpreting the statutes,
have created a decisional chaos hardly equalled in any other branch of
law. This confusion is due mainly to the language which makes the
choice of law reference depend upon where the cause of action "arose."
The Pennsylvania Act is a good example:
When a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the
state or country in which it arose, such bar shall be a complete
defense to an action thereon brought in any of the courts of this
commonwealth. 87
85. Comment, Impact of Significant Contacts on the Pennsylvania Borrowing
Statute, 72 DIcK. L. Rav. 598, 600 (1968). See also Ester, supra note 35, at 79; Ver-
non, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 RocKY
MT. L. REv. 287, 294 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Vernon].
86. It was possible to discuss the Henry, Dindo, and Farrier cases independently
of these statutes because neither New Hampshire, New Jersey, nor the District of Co-
lumbia had such a statute. See notes 1-7, 49-51, 56-59 & accompanying text supra.
87. PA. STAT. tit. 12, § 39 (1936). There is considerable variation among bor-
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The Third Circuit recently construed this language in Mack
Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co.8 Ben-
dix had sold brake pedal assemblies to Mack for use in its trucks. When
an assembly broke in Florida, the injured Florida purchaser recovered a
judgment there against Mack. Mack paid the judgment in Florida, and
the Florida court entered a satisfaction in the record. Mack then sued
Bendix for indemnity in Pennsylvania, where the assembly had been
manufactured, purchased, delivered, and installed in the truck. Pennsyl-
vania was also the state in which Mack was engaged in business. The
Third Circuit interpreted the Pennsylvania borrowing statute to refer to
Florida because Mack had paid the judgment there. The cause of action
"arose" in Florida, said the court, because "the cause of action arises
where as well as when the final significant event that is essential to a
suable claim occurs." 9 Under this interpretation of the statute, the
Pennsylvania plaintiff was denied the benefit of Pennsylvania's longer
period.
On the purely literal level, it is surprising to find a court which can
still say that a cause of action is created "at" a physical location-the
windshield which injures a passenger's head, or the rubber stamp of the
clerk who cashes the check which pays the judgment.
The circularity of so holding has frequently been pointed out. How,
for example, does the court know a cause of action arises "where" as
well as "when" an event occurs? By looking at the law of the state
within the borders of which the event occurred? But this answer does
not solve the problem of deciding which state's law to apply. Only by
assuming the solution in advance can one say that a cause of action
arises "where" an event occurred because the event occurred there.9"
rowing statutes, but most of them refer to the period of the state where the cause of
action "arose," "accrued," or "originated." For a comprehensive grouping according to
differing provisions, see Ester, supra note 35, at 79; Vernon, supra note 85, at 294.
88. 372 F.2d 18 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 930 (1967).
89. Id. at 20.
90. The circularity is even more obvious in cases in which the "time" of accrual
is also at issue. If, after a surgical operation in New York, the patient returns to Cal-
ifornia to convalesce, does the cause of action accrue in California when the malprac-
tice is discovered, as provided by California law, or does it accrue in New York at the
moment treatment ends, as provided by New York law? See Chartener v. Kice, 270
F. Supp. 432 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); see note 123 infra. And in a case of conversion, in
which the defendant innocently received property in Pennsylvania, does the cause of ac-
tion accrue in Pennsylvania where the property was received, as provided by Pennsyl-
vania law, or does it accrue in New York when the defendant's right to demand return
of the property becomes complete, as provided by New York law? See Federal Ins. Co.
v. Fries, 355 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1974); see note 146 infra.
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In Babcock v. Jackson," in which a New York guest in a New York
automobile was injured in Ontario by the negligence of his New York
host, the New York court ignored Ontario's guest statute and allowed
a recovery under New York law. Did the cause of action "arise" in
Ontario? In Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc.,92 in which a Pennsylvania
decedent was killed in an air crash in Colorado, the Pennsylvania court
ignored Colorado's damage limit and allowed a full recovery under
Pennsylvania law. Did the right to full damages "arise" in Colorado?
In neither of those cases could the court determine the legal conse-
quences of the events which occurred simply by looking at the events.
The legal effect of an event, the "arising of a cause of action," is only
determined by a law. It is obvious that the laws of New York and
Pennsylvania attached certain consequences to these events even
though they occurred outside the borders of those states. Whether
Ontario or Colorado also attached the same consequences does not
matter. One wonders whether, if one New York astronaut negligently
injured another New York astronaut while walking on the moon, any-
one would say the cause of action "arose' on the moon. A cause of
action would "arise" or "not arise" under the law of New York or of
any other jurisdiction whose law applied.93 What if the defendant in-
sisted, as the court did in Mack Trucks, that the cause of action arose
"where" as well as "when" the "final event occurred"? If New York
allowed a recovery, the answer would be that New York law was in
force on the moon. Would it add anything to say that "where" the
cause of action arose was "on the moon" under New York law? The
point, again, is simply that' a cause of action does not arise "in" a
physical location. It is not "created by a moon rock, a windshield, or a
banker's rubber stamp; a cause of action is created by a law.
Since the rights at issue in Babcock and Griffith in fact "arose!'
under the laws of New York and Pennsylvania, what basis-even literal-
ly-is there for saying that the duration of those rights should be limited
by either Ontario or Colorado? In Mack Trucks, the right of indemnity
depended upon the contractual or quasi-contractual duties arising from
the contract of purchase. That contract was made and breached in
Pennsylvania. The law of Pennsylvania recognizes a right of action upon
91. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
92. 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
93. See, e.g., Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213
N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965) (New York court applied Pennsylvania wrongful
death act to a crash occurring in Maryland); Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229
N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967) (New York court applied New York wrongful
death statute to an auto crash in North Carolina).
such facts. How, then, can one say this right "arose" in Florida or that
the Florida statute of limitations should limit it? If the check for
payment had been executed and cashed in Idaho would the cause of
action have arisen "in" Idaho? If the plaintiff had been forced to sue
upon the judgment in Pennsylvania, would the cause of action have
arisen "in" Pennsylvania upon satisfaction? These questions seem ab-
surd and they are absurd. The Supreme Court long ago put to rest the
territorialist idea that a cause of action can arise under only one legal
system. 4 A single event can cause rights of action to arise simultaneous-
ly in as many legal systems as are prepared to give relief. It was
principally to avoid the absurdities of territorialism that Pennsylvania
adopted interest analysis. If, in Griffith, Pennsylvania was prepared to
ignore Colorado's limitation on damages because Pennsylvania interests
predominated, would it not have ignored the Colorado limitation on
time for suit for the same reason? Likewise, the court in Mack Trucks
should have ignored Florida's shorter period in a suit for indemnity by a
Pennsylvania plaintiff on a Pennsylvania contract in a Pennsylvania
court.
We cannot really evaluate the Mack Trucks case, of course, by
staying within the discredited logic used to decide it. To deal with a
borrowing statute realistically one must identify first the reasons for its
enactment. Borrowing statutes advance the following policies:
(1) Repose for defendants. One would expect this policy to include the
interest of sparing the defendant the added hardship of defending
when the lapse of time has made proof more difficult. A borrowing
statute, however, is not used unless the forum's period is longer.1
5
Thus, one cannot say a borrowing statute is designed to "bar stale
claims" in the forum because the forum's stated policy is that the
claim is still timely. The only conceivable policy of repose, there-
fore, would be a sense that it is "unfair" to expose the defendant
once again to liability when he was safe under those periods which
he could reasonably expect to apply.
(2) Prevention of forum shopping. By subjecting the plantiff to a
foreign period which may bar his claim, the statute reduces the
forum court's workload. Since, however, the claim is not "stale"
94. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Carroll v. Lanza,
349 U.S. 408 (1955); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954);
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939);
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
95. See Ester, supra note 35, at 66; Vernon, supra note 85, at 298-99. See also
Schenk v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 377 F. Supp. 477 (W.D. Pa. 1974); see note 36 supra.
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according to forum policy, and since the forum's courts stand ready
to hear all timely claims, some additional characteristic must mark
some of these timely claims for the special treatment which borrow-
ing entails. There must be a policy against hearing certain types of
claims-those which, because of either their facts or their law, are
really "foreign"; that is, those in which some other court is the
more appropriate place for litigation.
(3) Mitigating the effect of the forum's tolling statute. Since, because
of tolling, most statutes of limitation do not begin to run until the
defendant enters the state,96 there is the problem of perpetual
liability for the ambulatory defendant. This difficulty may be
avoided if the defendant can also plead some other period of
limitation.
To these policies97 we should add the negative pregnant which they
contain, that plaintiffs should be able to bring their suits when these
defendant and court-protecting policies do not apply.
With respect to the policies of preventing forum shopping and
protecting defendants, it seems fairly clear why the drafters of so many
borrowing statutes refer the courts to the law of the state "where the
cause of action arose." Applying the period of a foreign state can
advance both policies when the foreign state is the only one concerned
with the transaction. In the typical tort case, for example, in which the
parties have had an accident in their own state, borrowing that state's
period protects the defendant's reliance on that period by preventing the
plaintiff from reviving the case in an unrelated second state which has a
longer period. Borrowing spares the courts of the state with the longer
period the burden of hearing cases with foreign parties, foreign facts,
and foreign law. A state should be able to enact a long period for cases
which concern it without being drowned in a flood of claims-barred
elsewhere by shorter periods-which do not concern it. By borrowing
the period where the cause "arises," the statutes achieve these ends.
In the light of these policies the decision in Mack Trucks is
disappointing. The defendant could not reasonably have relied upon the
shorter Florida period because the claim for indemnity was upon a
contract made, performed, and breached in Pennsylvania. Nor was the
cause "foreign" from the point of view of Pennsylvania's interest in
96. See Ester, supra note 35, at 43; Vernon, The Uniform Statute of Limitations
on Foreign Claims Act: Tolling Problems, 12 VAND. L. REv. 971, 982-83 (1959).
97. Other policies, in effect in a few states, have also been identified. For an
excellent general discussion see Ester, supra note 35.
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judicial economy, since it is a primary function of the Pennsylvania
courts to compensate Pennsylvania citizens for losses caused under
Pennsylvania contracts breached in Pennsylvania. Nor was there a toll-
ing problem. Borrowing Florida law advanced no conceivable policy
underlying the statute, whether defendant-protecting or court-protect-
ing. On the contrary, the court frustrated a clear Pennsylvania policy of
affording Pennsylvania citizens a reasonable time to sue in Pennsyl-
vania courts on Pennsylvania claims. The only interest of Florida
lapsed when its citizen was paid by Mack. Florida could have no pos-
sible concern with a dispute between two foreign manufacturers over
the out-of-state breach of their foreign contract.
To believe that the statutory language, which is not self-defining,
refers to Florida, one must believe the legislature intended to freeze
choice of law thinking forever into the territorialist mold. This possiblity
hardly seems likely since legislatures have generally counted upon the
courts to develop choice of law rules. There is no reason to think that by
passing an interstitial corrective, the legislature meant to halt this for-
ward motion. Even when statutes have intervened, the courts have been
expected to carry the law forward from the point where the statute stops.
Courts have generally decided, for example, when the time for suit
begins to run, 98 whether the period for torts or for contracts99 applies in
a given case, and how the various tolling provisions should operate.' 0
In all these matters, the courts have been expected to consider and
develop the policies underlying the various statutes. It thus seems far
more likely that the legislature intended the concept of "arising" to
change with new judicial conceptions of what the state's choice of law
policies were meant to achieve. In Mack Trucks, Judge Freedman took
this view in his dissent:
Statutes of limitation seem simple on their face because the time
period they fix can be measured by the clock. Experience has
shown, however, that even here unexpected problems arise which
present significant alternatives that can only be determined by a
choice of policy ....
The Pennsylvania Borrowing Statute in speaking of a "cause
of action" and where it "arose" has not undertaken to define these
98. See, e.g., Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 424 F.2d 427, 431
(2d Cir. 1970), discussed in text accompanying note 137 infra.
99. See, e.g., Colhoun v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 265 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1972), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 111-15 infra, and Meyers v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber
Corp., 40 App. Div. 2d 599, 335 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1972), discussed in text accompanying
note 117 infra.
100. See, e.g., West v. Theis, 15 Idaho 167, 96 P. 932 (1908), discussed in n.160
infra.
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terms, but has left them to be given content by judicial refinement
and clarification. This includes judicial developments in the future
as well as those which have taken place in the past. While we
may not alter the legislative command that the statutory period
fixed by the foreign state shall prevail in the designated cases,
nevertheless, what is a "cause of action" and when and where it
"arose" are matters for judicial interpretation and should reflect
current views of the relative significance of state interest as a
determinant of decision.' 01
Subsequent Pennsylvania cases reveal the soundness of Judge
Freedman's dissent. In Boeing Co. v. Spar Aerospace Prods. Ltd., 0 2 a
case virtually identical to Mack Trucks, the court was asked to interpret
Pennsylvania's "long arm" statute, which applied only to causes "arising
within this Commonwealth.' 11 3 The defendant Spar had sold parts in
Pennsylvania to Boeing to install there into Boeing's helicopters. After
one of the machines crashed in California, the heirs of the passengers
filed actions in California against Boeing, which Boeing settled. Boeing
then sued Spar in Pennsylvania for indemnity. The court said:
[I]t is clear, under -the facts of this case, that plaintiff's cause of
action arises out of the sale and delivery of helicopter component
parts to plaintiff in Pennsylvania for assembly in the helicopter
herein involved at plaintiff's Pennsylvania plant. The instant
action therefore clearly "arises within" Pennsylvania under any
construction of that phrase, even though arguably plaintiff had no
cause of action against defendants until plaintiff's liability to the
crash victims was determined by settlement of the civil actions filed
in California State Court.'0 4
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon a similar holding
by another federal diversity court sitting in Pennsylvania,' °5 and upon a
Third Circuit opinion interpreting this same "arising' requirement as
meaning "nothing more than that the cause of action be filed in Pennsyl-
vania."'0 6 In view of these developments, the majority position in Mack
Trucks already seems ripe for abandonment.
The "arising" or "accrual" language has also led to perverse results
in other states using interest analysis. In Mclndoo v. Burnett,10 7 two
101. 372 F.2d at 24, 25-26.
102. 380 F. Supp. 101 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
103. PA. STAT. tit. 15, § 2011(b) (1936) (repealed 1972).
104. 380 F. Supp. at 103-04.
105. Keene v. Multicore Solders Ltd., 379 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See
also Cohn v. Krauss, 45 Ohio L. Abs. 148, 67 N.E.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1943) (Ohio court
held that a cause of action for indemnity arose where the promise was made and not
where the debt was discharged).
106. Siders v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 423 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1970), cited in
380 F. Supp. at 103. The court in Siders did not mention Mack Trucks.
107. 494 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1974).
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Missouri residents agreed to travel together to a bowling tournament in
Illinois. The passenger, McIndoo, was injured in Illinois when Burnett's
car left the road and struck a tree. McIndoo's suit in Missouri was filed
within the Missouri period, but the defendant invoked the Missouri
borrowing statute and the shorter period of Illinois."°8 The court held
that Illinois law applied, reasoning that "where the tort takes place in a
foreign jurisidiction Missouri will adopt the statute of limitations of that
jurisdiction .... ,ll Of course, the very issue to be decided was
"whether the tort [took] place in a foreign jurisdiction." To assume the
conclusion, that the tort "takes place" at the place of injury, is totally
unresponsive in a state following interest analysis. Illinois has no con-
ceivable interest in shortening the time for suit by one Missouri resident
against another in a Missouri court. Missouri, on the other hand, has a
clear policy of permitting its own citizens to file claims arising out of
Missouri facts within the time Missouri has allowed. The court's decision
simply seems perverse. 110
Characterization, that familiar device, has been used to manipulate
the choice of law reference when the claim can be in either contract or
tort. In Colhoun v. Greyhound Lines, Inc."' a Florida resident was
injured in Tennessee on a bus trip which began in Florida, where she
purchased her ticket. Her Florida suit was timely under Florida's three-
year limit but was barred by the shorter period of Tennessee. Florida's
borrowing statute required a foreign reference "when the cause of action
has arisen in another state or territory of the United States.""' 2 The
court held that the tort claim arose in Tennessee because "a cause of
action sounding in tort arises in the jurisdiction where the last act
necessary to establish liability occurred.""' 3 The contract claim, how-
ever, was a different matter: "Where the last act necessary to complete
the contract is performed, that is the place of the contract. . . . The
contract in the instant case was completed in Florida with the purchase
108. "Whenever a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state,
territory or country in which it originated, said bar shall be a complete defense to any
action thereon, brought in any of the courts of this state." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.190
(Vernon Supp. 1975).
109. 494 F.2d at 1313.
110. The diversity court was compelled to this result by the earlier Missouri deci-
sions. See Gates v. Trans World Airlines, 493 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. App. 1973); Girth
v. Beaty Grocery Co., 407 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1966), criticized in WEINTRAUB, supra note
39, at 52.
111. 265 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1972).
112. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.10 (1960), amended (Supp. 1975).
113. 265 So. 2d at 21, quoting Ester, supra note 35, at 47.
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of a bus ticket."114 One can only smile at the quaintness of this distinc-
tion. Under the contract, the "last act necessary to establish liability"
was not, after all, the breach. The court's reasoning ignores, of course,
the old doctrine that questions of performance are governed by the place
of performance.1 5
It is obvious what is happening. The court in Colhoun is straining
to accomplish the same result that New York did in Kilberg v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc."8e In both cases, a local citizen on a trip from his home
was injured outside the state by a carrier who had a continous and
important local business, and in each case the forum did a characteriza-
tion trick so that local policy would apply. New York characterized the
issue of damage limitations as "procedural," and Florida characterized
an accident claim for personal injuries as "contractual." Kilberg was
only a way station for New York on the road to interest analysis;
Colhoun may well be the same for Florida.
There are other examples of this straining. In Meyers v. Dunlop
Tire & Rubber Corp.,"x7 a Kentucky resident was injured in Kentucky
by a defective tire manufacured in New York and sold to his Kentucky
employer F.O.B. Buffalo. When asked to apply the New York borrow-
ing statute, the appellate division held that the tort claim arose in
Kentucky, where it was barred, but that the contract claim arose in New
York, where it was timely. In Coan v. Cessna Aircraft,"" the Illinois
court interpreted its tolling statute in such a way as to exempt from its
borrowing statute an Illinois plaintiff injured in Kentucky. The Illinois
tolling statute provided that no tolling would occur if the parties were
nonresidents. That provision meant, according to the court, that tolling
must occur if the parties were residents. If the borrowing statute applied
to residents, however, a resident plaintiff would not have the benefit of
the tolled Illinois period against an absent resident defendant because
the borrowing statute might, despite the absence, refer to the shorter
114. Id. (citation omitted).
115. See, e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATiSE ON TnE CONFPLCT OF Lkws §§ 185, 187,
192 (1962); R. LEFLAR, supra note 8, § 151; G. STUMERO , PRINCinLEs OF CoNFLrT
oF LAws 262-65 (3d ed. 1963).
116. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). In Kilberg New
York applied its own higher measure of damages in a wrongful death case arising from
the crash in Massachusetts of an airliner bound for Nantucket from New York City.
The court held that it was contrary to New York public policy to limit the damages
for wrongful death and held also that damage limitations were "procedural" questions
governed by forum law. This latter ground was withdrawn in Davenport v. Webb, 11
N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962).
117. 40 App. Div. 2d 599, 335 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1972).
118. 53 Ill. 2d 526, 293 N.E.2d 588 (1973).
period of another state. Thus, in order to allow the tolling statute to
operate fully, said the court, the borrowing statute must be interpreted
not to apply when both parties are forum residents. This result, when
judged by policy, makes sense: the court in a false conflict advances
forum policy by applying its plaintiff-protecting longer period when the
state of injury is indifferent to the defendant. The result announced by
the court, however, is illogical because plaintiff never alleged that the
defendant was ever absent from Illinois. Perhaps the most bizzare effort
of all occurred in Holdsworth v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 119 in which a
diversity court in Indiana held that it could not determine, under the
Indiana borrowing statute, where a cause of action arose under the
Illinois Dram Shop Act. 120 The plaintiff was injured in Indiana by an
automobile the driver of which had allegedly purchased intoxicating
liquor in Illinois from the Illinois defendant. The Dram Shop Act barred
all actions under it not commenced within one year, and the plaintiff's
claim was not within that limit. Since Indiana had no law creating any
liability whatever on the facts alleged, it is logically impossible that the
claim could have "arisen" under Indiana law. Whether it arose "in"
Indiana "under" Illinois law reminds one of the moon hypothetical.
Once it is clear that only Illinois law can be the foundation of any right,
it cannot conceivably matter where the injury occurred.
One can see a transition in Klondike Helicopters, Ltd. v. Fairchild
Hiller Corp."' There, a citizen of British Columbia was killed in British
Columbia by the crash of a helicopter he had purchased in California
from the Maryland defendant. Plaintiff filed suit in Illinois, where it was
timely, but the defendant invoked the familiar "arising" language of the
Illinois borrowing statute. The diversity court applied the Restatement
Second's "most significant relationship" test to determine where the tort
claim for personal injuries arose. The court noted that Illinois had
recently adopted that approach. 21 Since the plaintiff was domiciled in
British Columbia, where the crash occurred, British Columbia had the
most significant relationship to the case, and the claim "arose" there
despite the negligence alleged to have occurred in California. On the
"contractual" claim for breach of warranty, however, the court reverted
119. 370 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ind. 1974). Compare Zucker v. Vogt, 200 F. Supp.
340 (D. Conn. 1961) and Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365
(1957), with Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 151, 95 N.E.2d 512
(1950). In the latter, Illinois refused the benefit of its Dram Shop Act to a nonresident
injured outside Illinois.
120. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975).
121. 334 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. II. 1971).
122. See Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 111. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970).
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to the traditional theory. It referred to California, on admittedly firmer
ground than in Colhoun, because the helicopter was contracted for in
California, and also was delivered there. One wonders how the signifi-
cance of British Columbia's relation to the claim, whether tested by
residence, place of injury, place of contracting, or place of negligence,
can vary according to whether the same facts are given one label or
another.
As one might expect, this territorial view of the "place of arising"
has shown the same pattern of development, and decay, as the territorial
theory itself. First, we see a mechanical formula producing results
arbitrary from the standpoint of logic and policy,"z then we see manip-
ulation of the formula so the results can be avoided, and finally, we see a
move toward disavowal of the formula.
The first case to use anything like a policy analysis to interpret a
123. The "last act" doctrine might be illustrated further. In a New York diversity
case, a Massachusetts purchaser of stock sued his New York broker in New York for
violations of the federal securities laws. The transactions occurred by long distance tel-
ephone between the two states. Since there was no federal period of limitations, the
diversity court looked to New York's choice of law rules. The court said that "the cause
of action accrues for purposes of the borrowing statute in the state where the injury
is suffered rather than where the defendant committed the wrongful acts." Sack v. Low,
478 F.2d 360, 366 (2d Cir. 1973). Thus, the issue became where the loss was sus-
tained. In true territorialist fashion, the court speculated on where this might be: "We
do not know exactly how plaintiffs paid for the securities-whether by check sent from
Massachusetts or in some other fashion; perhaps if the plaintiffs maintained an open
account at defendant's New, York offices, and the loss was reflected in that account,
this might make some difference." Id. at 367-68. This effort seems particularly mis-
placed in a case in which the right is given by federal law. The defendant has breached
a duty declared by the people of the United States, the remedy for which would appear
to arise everywhere simultaneously. The "arising" language of a borrowing statute is
meaningless here. A better guide is found in a Sixth Circuit case in which the court
said that it should "choose among the several state statutes of limitation and apply that
one which best effectuates the federal policy at issue." Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d
97, 100 (6th Cir. 1967).
In a second case, a California resident brought a New York diversity suit for mal-
practice against a New York physician. The plaintiff sought damages for the wrongful
death and pain and suffering of his wife, who had been treated by the defendant during
her trips to New York. The court held that the New York borrowing statute did not
apply to the survival action for pain and suffering, because the cause of action accrued
in New York upon "termination of the last treatment." The borrowing statute did ap-
ply, however, to the wrongful death claim because it accrued upon the wife's death in
California, where she had gone to convalesce. Chartener v. Kice, 270 F. Supp. 432,
438 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). In a case such as this, in which the defendant is probably not
suable in the state whose period is borrowed, it is difficult to see how "a cause of ac-
tion" can "accrue" there in any meaningful sense. New York has, of course, applied
its own wrongful death act to a death occurring outside New York. Farber v. Smolack,
20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967).
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borrowing statute was George v. Douglas Aircraft Co. 12 4 Crewmembers
on a Braniff flight from Florida to South America were injured when
the plane crashed in Florida after takeoff. Their diversity suit in New
York alleged that Douglas had breached an implied warranty when it
sold the plane to Braniff. The sale, manufacture and delivery occurred
in California. As to the question of substantive liability, the court said
New York would look to Florida law to define the extent of the
warranty; it then held, however, that the claim "arose" in California
for purposes of the New York borrowing statute. The court managed
to reach this conclusion by deciding which policies should be taken to
underlie the statute. It found the main policy to be that of counteracting
tolling. Since New York was really a disinterested forum (no party was
from New York and no part of the transaction occurred in New York)
the court felt that it could best achieve this purpose by referring to the
state where the defendant would always be amenable to suit:
In personal injury actions against a manufacturer, the latter's
amenability to suit in the place of injury would be fortuitous .. .
and the usual tolling statute in that state might indefinitely prolong
the limitations period. On the other hand, the manufacturer would
always be suable in the state of manufacture and generally in that
of delivery, the two latter being identical in the instant case.
125
It followed that reference to California law would best advance New
York policy. It was "more likely to . . . (avoid) prolonging the period
of limitations because of the defendant's absence from a jursidiction
where there was no reason to expect him to be present."' 26 In effect,
George exemplifies a disinterested forum using interest analysis to pro-
tect itself against foreign claims which could have been litigated else-
where. The court applied the period most likely to cut off the claim. The
court might have reached the same result without a borrowing statute if
it had used the method of Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc.127 discussed above.
There, New Jersey refused its own longer period to a foreign plaintiff,
who could have sued elsewhere on his foreign claim, by treating the
limitation issue as substantive and then finding no New Jersey policy in
favor of allowing suit.
The George case is still more complicated than that, however. By
referring to California law, the court did advance the California policy
of shielding the California defendant behind California's shorter period.
This was done, though, at the expense of whatever interest Florida may
124. 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964).
125. Id. at 78.
126. Id.
127. 63 NJ. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973); see text accompanying notes 27-33 supra.
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have had in allowing a recovery. The George court recognized this
Florida interest by preferring it over California's on the issues of war-
ranty and strict liability. One must ask, then, what the reason was for
preferring California on the limitations point. If the purpose was simply
to reject all claims in which the forum is disinterested, then the court
should also have referred to California's liability law, if that would have
defeated the plaintiff's claim. One way of pruning the docket is as good
as another. The only rational answer would seem to lie in the court's
concern for tolling. A reference to the place of injury would indeed
prolong the time unreasonably if that state's period were tolled by the
defendant's absence. If this reasoning is the basis for the rule, then one
wonders what the court would do when the defendant would be suable
in the state of injury.
Tolling was not an issue in Gross v. McDonald,2 ' in which the
auto of parties temporarily residing in Kentucky crashed in Indiana
during a round trip drive to a boat club just across the border. A
diversity court in Pennsylvania, the disinterested forum, held that Ken-
tucky's policy on liability should prevail over Indiana's guest statute.
The court held that Indiana's policy was inapplicable because neither
the defendant nor his insurer resided in Indiana. On the question of
borrowing, however, the court referred to Indiana, citing Mack Trucks.
Since in Indiana the suit was still timely, the result was a recovery in
Pennsylvania on a claim blocked in Indiana by a guest statute and
barred in Kentucky by an expired statute of limitations. Whatever this
may be (dipegage29 is probably the word), it is clear that the method
of George is not being followed. In Gross, the method is wholly mechan-
ical; Indiana was picked under the "last act" doctrine.
The best way to understand and evaluate these cases is to look at
them through a policy analysis. In George, a disinterested forum re-
solved a true conflict by preferring the place where the defendant
resided and where he manufactured the plane, and it did so on perhaps
the only policy basis available-avoiding the perpetual liability some-
times caused by the borrowing of tolling provisions. In Gross, a disinter-
ested forum faced a false conflict. Kentucky's shorter period declared a
clear policy of shielding its resident defendant. The intent of Indiana's
longer period was more complicated because a longer period can imple-
128. 354 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
129. See, e.g., Lillegraven v. Tengs, 375 P.2d 139 (Alas. 1962); Reese, D~pecage:
A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. Rv. 58 (1973); Wilde,
Dipegage in the Choice of Tort Law, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 329 (1968).
ment policies of deterrence as well as compensation. 130 Indiana's longer
period in Gross, therefore, could be taken as implementing the deterrent
aspect of any right in tort created by Indiana on these facts, even though
the plaintiff was from another state. The problem is that Indiana has not
created any rights on these facts because of its guest statute. The longer
period for suit cannot implement what is not there. It follows that
applying Indiana's longer period would advance none of its policies,
unless, perhaps, Indiana would not apply its guest statute to nonresident
parties under these facts. If it would not,'' its only excuse would be
interest analysis, which should then cause it to respect the shorter period
of Kentucky for the reasons given by New Jersey in Heavner v. Uniroy-
al, Inc., discussed above.132 In short, the Gross decision thwarts the only
policy which the court could conceivably advance, that of Kentucky,
without advancing any policy whatsoever of Indiana, and it does so by
permitting suit in Pennsylvania under a statute designed to protect that
state from foreign claims. Obviously, the method of George is to be
preferred.' 33
Since George, other courts have also applied interest analysis to
borrowing statutes. In Thigpen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 34 Alabama
residents were injured in Kentucky by a collision between the bus in
which they were riding and another vehicle. They had boarded the bus
in Alabama and were bound for Ohio. In the Ohio suit, the defendant
bus company urged that Kentucky's shorter period be applied under the
Ohio borrowing statute. The court refused because the contract portion
of the claim clearly arose in Alabama or Ohio135 and because "[elven
as a tort action, the facts alleged in the petition [that the injury occurred
in Kentucky] are too incomplete to afford any conclusion on the degree
of nexus that Kentucky has to the cause of action as compared to Ohio
130. California, for example, has held that its higher measure of damages for
wrongful death expresses a policy of deterrence and that granting full damages when
a nonresident is killed in California advances this policy. Hurtado v. Superior Ct., 11
Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974).
131. Indiana has accepted interest analysis in the context of guest statutes. With-
erspoon v. Salm, 142 Ind. App. 655, 237 N.E.2d 116 (1968). See also Watts v. Pioneer
Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965); see text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
132. See text accompanying notes 27-33 supra.
133. See Gegan, Where Does A Personal Injury Action Accrue Under the New
York Borrowing Statute, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 62 (1972); Siegel, Conflict of Laws,
19 SYRACuSE L. REv. 235 (1967).
134. 11 Ohio App. 2d 179, 229 N.E.2d 107 (1967).
135. Id. at 181, 229 N.E.2d at 109. See Colhoun v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 265
So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1972); see text accompanying notes 111-16 supra.
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and Alabama."'136 In Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,13 7 a
second claim growing out of the same Florida crash which gave rise to
George, the Second Circuit again rejected the "jurisidiction-selecting"
approach of the older cases and wisely applied the New York law of
accrual, under which the period for breach of warranty accrues at sale,
instead of the Florida law of accrual, under which the period accrues at
the date of discovery. It did so because the claim was no longer timely in
the New York forum and because it found a policy of judicial economy
in the New York law of accrual.13
The most explicit example of policy analysis to date, however,
occurred in O'Keefe v. Boeing Co.' 39 There, the Air Force crew of a B-
52 bomber sued Boeing in New York for injuries caused by a crash in
Maine during training exercises. Having planned two alternative routes
for the flight, -the crew decided after takeoff in Massachusetts to follow
the northern one over Maine rather than the southern one over the
Carolinas. The plane crashed when the tail assembly separated during
heavy turbulence. Boeing argued, of course, that Maine law controlled
both liability and the time for bringing suit.
The court's opinion began with a reference to Long v. Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, Inc.,'4" in which New York applied the Pennsyl-
vania wrongful death act to an air crash in Maryland. The court
compared Long with O'Keefe:
Maine's relationship to the case at bar is certainly no less
accidental nor more significant than Maryland's relationship to
Long. For example, a B-52 is hardly an instrument of commercial
carriages flying regularly scheduled commercial routes ....
[There is no contention ithat any of the members of the crew(s)
were citizens of Maine. In short, the inescapable conclusion to be
drawn is that this court is not compelled to refer to any part of
the law of Maine in this case. But this does not mean that the
deaths and injuries in Maine did not give rise to the causes of action
for wrongful death and personal injury asserted by the plaintiffs
since all of the states with more significant relationships to B-52
bombers in general and B-406 in particular allow for such actions,
to wit, California, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Ohio, Okla-
homa and Washington.1
41
Thus, upon a policy analysis, the court found that of all the states
which might be concerned, the state of injury was the least relevant. But
136. 11 Ohio App. 2d at 181, 229 N.E.2d at 109.
137. 424 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970).
138. Id. at431.
139. 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
140. 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965).
141. 335 F. Supp. at 1111.
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what then should the reference be? Under the New York borrowing
statute, should the claim be held to "arise" in every state the court
mentioned? The plaintiffs alleged "18 ways" in which the defendant
had been negligent. "Two of these" the court said, "relate ultimately to
activities in California. Eleven of the alleged acts of commission or
omission appear to relate to the defendant's activities at the Air Force
bases in California, Nebraska, Ohio and Oklahoma and at the defend-
ant's facility at Wichita, as well as possibly to Westover in Massachu-
setts."' 42 Does a cause "arise" in each of these places?
The court resolved the matter by looking to the law of Washington.
Relying upon George it chose the state where the plane was "designed,
manufactured, sold and delivered,"' 43 and held that "[a]lmost all of the
alleged acts of negligence . . . are referable, directly or indirectly, to
Washington. . . ."I" The result was that "for purposes of applying the
New York borrowing statute the plaintiffs' causes of action accrued in
Washington as a result of the crash in Maine." '145
So the court rejects the traditional theory and the last act doctrine
with it. In its place we have a policy analysis. Indeed, it would have been
indefensible on the facts presented to decide the case in any other way.
If we now assume, however, that we do have a policy analysis, what can
we say about how it works? In O'Keefe, for example, how do the
policies of the forum or the state of Washington explain the court's
result? The period of the forum, New York, had not expired, so no
forum policy of stale claims stood in the way, as it had in Braniff. The
court found Maine policy irrelevant. The question, then, was whether
borrowing Washington law advanced some Washington policy. The
most the O'Keefe plaintiffs can claim on the facts, absent an allegation
of Washington residence, is a Washington policy of deterrence. An
unexpired period in Washington could serve to discourage Washington
negligence by allowing plaintiffs who are injured by it a longer time to
sue. When no other state has a relevant policy, this rationale may be
enough. If Washington's period had run, the Washington period would
not express a plaintiff-protecting policy, and so the fact that the negli-
gence occurred there would be irrelevant. In fact, the shorter Washing-
ton period would express the contrary policy of repose for its resident
defendant. The New York court would then have to weigh this de-
142. Id. at 1112 (footnotes omitted).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1113.
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fendant-protecting Washington policy against that of any other con-
cerned state whose period had not run.
Enough has been said to show the general direction of the law.
Other cases might also be discussed, 146 but George, Thigpen, Braniff
and O'Keefe show the basic approach. In sum, it is fair to say that some
respectable courts have broken away from the older view of borrowing
statutes and, as it becomes more apparent that the older theory is self-
defeating and arbitrary, more courts should follow suit. There is cer-
tainly no reason in policy for treating the older theory any differently in
the law of limitations than it has been treated elsewhere. Courts follow-
ing interest analysis should be urged, therefore, to interpret the "aris-
ing' language in a way which advances the policies which underlie the
statutes.
Precisely how would such an interpretative method work? It is
suggested that a court should interpret a borrowing statute according to
the same "rules" as those set out above for applying interest analysis
generally to a statute of limitations. Since a borrowing statute is really a
choice of law rule,l17 it should not shock anyone if it is interpreted so as
to implement what the court has found-by interest analysis--to be the
choice of law policy of the state. The contrary would seem more
shocking. Since borrowing statutes were designed to combat the
notion-the territorialist notion-that limitations are "procedural," the
statutes should not be interpreted so as to perpetuate the error, and the
system, they were meant to overcome.
How would these "rules" be applied? It will be recalled that Rule I
stated that forum law would apply whenever the forum's period was
shorter. In effect, this Rule has already been adopted, because the courts
have construed borrowing statutes so as to be inapplicable whenever the
forum's period has run. 48 The reason for this interpretation is the same
as the reason given above for Rule I itself: to advance the forum policy
146. In a New York case, the court applied interest analysis to the issue of accrual
in a suit for conversion of jewelry mistakenly delivered to a New Yorker in Pennsyl-
vania. Under Pennsylvania law the action accrued in Pennsylvania; under New York
law the action accrued in New York. The court applied the New York law of accrual
and ignored the New York borrowing statute. Federal Ins. Co. v. Fries, 78 Misc. 2d
805, 355 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1974). In a Seventh Circuit case a Cal-
ifornia witness sued to recover his fees in connection with an antitrust suit pending in
Illinois. The services were rendered in both California and Illinois. The court held
that since Illinois was the state of "the most significant relationship to [the] contract,"
the claim "arose" there and the Illinois borrowing statute did not apply. Hamilton v.
General Motors Corp., 490 F.2d 223, 225-26 n.1 (7th Cir. 1973).
147. See, e.g., Reinhard v. Textron, Inc., 516 P.2d 1325 (Okla. 1973).
148. See note 95 supra.
of judicial economy. 49 Thus interest analysis seems already to find
support in traditional practice. Indeed, interest analysis gives the best
explanation for the traditional interpretation, because, if the purpose of
borrowing statute is simply to characterize limitations as "substantive,"
then it would follow under the territorial theory that the foreign period
should be borrowed even if it is longer.150 Of course, this result did not
occur, because the courts advanced the forum's policy of judicial econo-
my.
Rule II stated that the shorter foreign period would apply when it
was designed to benefit the defendant and no policy of the forum or any
other state was designed to benefit the plaintiff. This is surely the classic
"false conflict" for which borrowing statutes were designed. By referring
to foreign law the statute avoids the senseless reference to forum law of
the traditional theory, which characterized limitations as "procedural."
To apply forum law to such a case would frustrate the foreign state's
policy of repose without advancing any policy of the forum. The statute
produces a better result and, again, must have been intended to do so for
the same reasons as those given above for Rule H itself. In the case in
which the conflict is between two foreign states, as in Gross v. McDon-
ald, '5 the shorter period of the defendant's residence would be applied
if the other state were disinterested. The perverse result in Gross,
therefore, would not be reached under this Rule.
Rule III is the converse of Rule II. It states that the shorter foreign
period should not apply whenever it is not intended to benefit the
defendant and the longer forum period is intended to benefit the plain-
tiff. To apply foreign law frustrates the plaintiff-protecting policy of the
forum without advancing any policy of the foreign state. It is definitely
not a solution to this false conflict to defeat the policy of the only
concerned state by referring to a state which is disinterested. To do so
produces the perverse results of McIndoo v. Burnett'52 and Mack
Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 5 '
criticized above.' 54 It was to prevent just such results that the borrowing
statutes of so many states exempted local plaintiffs. 55 In this exemption
149. Id.
150. See Ester, supra note 35, at 66. For a strange case characterizing the longer
foreign period as "substantive" and then applying it see Marine Const. & Design Co.
v. Vessel Tim, 434 P.2d 683 (Alas. 1967).
151. 354 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Pa. 1973); see text accompanying notes 128-33 supra.
152. 494 F.2d 1311 (8thCir. 1974).
153. 372 F.2d 18 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 930 (1967).
154. See note 98 & accompanying text supra.
155. See Ester, supra note 35, at 80, listing twenty-four jurisdictions in which the
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we again find a precedent in traditional practice for the results advocat-
ed under interest analysis. The local plaintiff exemption and Rule I
have exactly the same basis in policy: to implement the plaintiff-protect-
ing effect of the forum's longer period. In practice, these exemptions
make the cause "arise' in the forum because the plaintiff's right to bring
suit there is absolute until the forum's period expires. By assuring local
plaintiffs the benefit of the local period, the legislature has declared a
forum interest in having its own period govern its own citizens in its own
courts. If a state does not have such an exemption, there is nothing to
prevent a court from using the widespread practice of adopting these
exemptions as a guide to the best interpretation of its own statute.15 6
Surely one should not presume that the legislature actually intended the
results of Mclndoo and Mack Trucks.
Rule IV stated that the shorter foreign period would not be applied
when it was not intended to benefit the defendant and the longer period
of some state other than the forum was intended to benefit the plaintiff.
This situation is similar to that in Rule HI, and the false conflict should
be resolved in the same manner, the only difference being that here the
interested state is not the forum. O'Keefe v. Boeing Company,157 dis-
cussed above, is the example of how this Rule would be applied.
Rule V declared that the shorter foreign period may or may not be
applied either when a true conflict exists or when all states are disinter-
ested. George v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,'58 discussed above, is the closest
example of a true conflict, if it can be assumed that Florida had a
plaintiff-protecting policy in that case. An example of a case in which all
states are disinterested could be made by taking Cornwell v. C.I.T.
Corp. of New York, 59 also discussed above, and adding a hypothetical
borrowing statute in the District of Columbia. In both these examples,
one could expect the court to search beyond the policies directly in-
volved for some method of evaluating the mutually conflicting or irrele-
vant policies. George indicates that the impact of tolling would tip the
scale when tolling could be a factor. Otherwise, the court should under-
borrowing statute is not applicable if the plaintiff is a citizen or resident of the forum.
The scope of the exception for local plaintiffs is sometimes difficult to measure. See
Jones v. Greyhound Bus Lines, 73 Misc. 2d 109, 341 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
156. See Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973), in which
the New Jersey court reinterpreted the common law in such a way as to recharacterize
the statute of limitations as substantive. The New Jersey court did so despite the ab-
sence of a borrowing statute in New Jersey. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
157. 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
158. 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1964); see text accompanying notes 124-33 supra.
159. 373 F. Supp. 661 (D.D.C. 1974).
take the weighing described in the discussion of Part (a) of Rule V
above, or perhaps revert to the older methods of decision described in
the discussion of Part (b) of Rule V.
Thus far, tolling has not been considered in the application of these
Rules to borrowing statutes. It will be recalled, however, that one
purpose of borrowing is to mitigate the effects of tolling. 160 When
legislatures passed borrowing statutes, they were mindful of cases in
which a foreign obligor on a foreign claim moved into the forum and
became suable there because of the forum's tolling statute, which would
have suspended the forum period because of the obligor's absence.' 61
The reason the obligor became suable in the forum, of course, was the
mechanical reference to forum law under the territorial theory, which
characterized limitations as "procedural." This method of analysis had
the effect of making the ambulatory defendant perpetually liable in
every state with this type of tolling legislation. The sensible thing would
have been to consider limitations as substantive and apply the foreign
period under interest analysis. This approach, however, would not be
possible under the territorial theory, and so legislatures enacted borrow-
ing statutes to avoid a perverse result. As interest analysis becomes
accepted, however, this function of the borrowing statute will become
obsolete. A court following Rule II, for example, would interpret its
borrowing statute so as to refer to the shorter period of the interested
foreign state when the claim is wholly foreign. Courts in states which do
not have borrowing statutes should realize that by switching to interest
analysis they solve this aspect of the tolling problem.
The above refers only to the situation in Rule II, which presents a
particular type of false conflict. As we have seen, tolling considerations
offer an additional inducement for the adoption of Rule H. But what of
the other Rules? How does tolling affect the impact of the other Rules
160. "The prevailing interpretation of tolling statutes based on defendant's absence
from the enacting jurisdiction, coupled with the rule requiring the forum to apply its
own period of limitation, has resulted in the possibility of perpetual liability for an am-
bulatory defendant." Ester, supra note 35, at 42. The tolling problem in the context
of borrowing statutes is illustrated by an Idaho case. The defendant, who executed
promissory notes in Kansas which were payable there, left that state before its period
had run. He then resided in Washington for its full period. The action was brought
eighteen years later when he moved to Idaho. The Idaho court said the Idaho borrow-
ing statute, referring to Kansas, did not help the defendant because the Kansas period
was tolled by the defendant's absence from Kansas, and that Idaho's period did not help
him 'either because it did not begin to run until he arrived in Idaho. Under this inter-
pretation, the defendant would have been liable in Idaho no matter how long it had
been before he moved there. West v. Theis, 15 Idaho 167, 96 P. 932 (1908).
161. This was the interpretation in West v. Theis, 15 Idaho 167, 96 P. 932 (1908).
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on the "arising' language of borrowing statutes? Rule I is not affected
by tolling considerations because no borrowing occurs when the forum's
period is shorter. Rule I is not affected, either, because no borrowing
occurs when the interested forum's plaintiff-protecting policy deems the
cause to have "arisen' in the forum. Rule IV, in which a disinterested
forum decides a false conflict between the periods of foreign states,
might be affected. That Rule suggested that the state having the longer
period should be preferred when the facts generated a plaintiff-protect-
ing policy in that state and no defendant-protecting policy in the state
having the shorter period. Should the Rule be altered if the interested
state has tolling legislation and the defendant is not present there? If the
plaintiff-protecting policy were one of deterrence of negligent conduct
within the interested state's boundaries, then a "long-arm" statute would
probably solve the problem by exposing the defendant to process in the
interested state. Long-arm statutes are another component of a state's
overall policy of protecting plaintiffs. Absent sufficient contact for long
arm jurisidiction, however, the only jusitification for borrowing would
probably be the compensatory interest generated by the plaintiff's domi-
cile. A possible solution in such a case would be to construe the tolling
statute of the interested state so as not to apply when all aspects of the
transaction occurred abroad. Otherwise, the defendant would be perpet-
ually liable in the interested state and probably also in the forum unless
the forum's tolling statute were given a similar interpretation. e2
The influence of tolling on Rule V is illustrated by the George case,
in which a disinterested forum was confronted with a true conflict
between the periods of foreign states (assuming again that Florida law
expressed a plaintiff-protecting policy under the facts). If the defendant
manufacturer had not been suable in Florida, perpetual laibility would
have resulted from borrowing its tolling legislation. In the case of a true
conflict, or a "conflict" in which no state's policy can be advanced,
tolling considerations are probably as good a method as any for deciding
cases in which they are relevant.
Limits on the Power of Choice
Would it have made any difference, then, in Henry whether or not
New Jersey had a borrowing statute? A drug put into commerce by a
New Jersey manuafcturer deforms a child in Quebec. The New Jersey
162. This was the result in West v. Theis, 15 Idaho 167, 96 P. 932 (1908). It
could have been avoided by interpreting the forum's tolling legislation so as not to apply
to transactions occurring wholly outside the state. Under the court's approach, however,
there was perpetual liability despite the forum's borrowing statute.
forum has the longer period, and the New Jersey court applying interest
analysis must decide whether New Jersey policy requires a recovery.
Under a borrowing statute, should not the court make exactly the
interpretation of forum policy as it has already made without one? If the
court decides under interest analysis that New Jersey policy calls for the
application of New Jersey law, hasn't the court decided also that the
claim arises "in" New Jersey in the sense that New Jersey and not
Quebec law should govern it? Conversely, if it decides that New Jersey
policy does not call for the application of New Jersey law, hasn't it
decided that the claim does not arise in New Jersey? The issue under
interest analysis seems the same whether or not there is a borrowing
statute.
The more difficult question in Henry is whether the longer New
Jersey period expresses a plaintiff-protecting policy under the facts
alleged. The Third Circuit said it did not. Nevertheless, one may argue
that an important objective of New Jersey's municipal law would have
been advanced by affording the Quebec plaintiff a longer time in which
to sue. The lower court in Henry noted that the claim was not "stale"
under New Jersey law16 and rested its holding on the defendant's act of
"testing and manufacturing harmful drugs in New Jersey, and placing
these drugs in the stream of interstate and international commerce
... "164 New Jersey was the "primary manufacturing and distribution
site for [defendant's] thalidomide operations in North America," '165 and
"the standard of care defendant exercised in conducting its clinical
testing activity in New Jersey could . . . [relate] to defendant's alleged
negligence in deciding to market an unsafe drug."' 66 Thus, the lower
court found that a New Jersey policy of deterrence applied to these facts,
and also found that it would advance such a policy to apply New
Jersey's longer period, a result supported by the cases already discussed.
In Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse Inc., 6 ' Meyers v.
Dunlop Tire and Rubber Corp.,' 68 and O'Keefe v. Boeing Co.,'69 for
example, the courts all applied the longer period of the place of manu-
facture.
163. Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1192, 1203 (D.N.J. 1973),
rev'd, 508 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1975).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1205.
166. Id.
167. 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
168. 40 App. Div. 2d 599, 335 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1972).
169. 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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Why, then, did the Third Circuit find no New Jersey interest? The
court began by ruling that New Jersey's longer period expressed the
usual tort policies of compensation and deterrence, and it disposed of
the compensation policy by noting that the plaintiff was not a New
Jersey resident.170 Obviously, it was the deterrence policy that was
crucial. In addressing it, the court assumed first that New Jersey "would
posit an interest in deterring misconduct because of defective manufac-
ture within the state."1' Despite this assumption, however, the court
then dismissed the place of manufacture as irrelevant:
It is undisputed that New Jersey's contacts with the drug began
long after the design stages and that the raw thalidomide manufac-
tured in New Jersey did not deviate from the specifications set by
-the German developer and the Ohio laboratories of defendant
Richardson-Merrell. Thus, any possible New Jersey policy of
enforcing a duty, owed because of tortious misconduct in New
Jersey, is inapplicable; the plaintiff has specifically stated that there
is nothing improper about the way the drug was manufactured. 72
The same arugment applied to the New Jersey testing. 73
Thus, the court seems to have held that a forum policy of prevent-
ing injuries from unsafe drugs cannot be advanced simply by applying it
170. Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 35 (3d Cir. 1975). The
court relied upon the cases of Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412
(1973) and Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 NJ. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970). In Uni-
royal, New Jersey expressed no interest in a North Carolina plaintiff injured at home
by a product purchased there, and in Pfau New Jersey expressed no compensatory inter-
est in a Connecticut plaintiff injured in Iowa by a New Jersey defendant. The New
Jersey court did, however, reserve in Uniroyal the right to apply New Jersey law to "sit-
uations involving significant interests of this state." 63 NJ. at 141, 305 A.2d at 418.
And in Pfau the New Jersey court said: "We are not certain that a defendant's domicile
lacks an interest in seeing that its domiciliaries are held to the full measure of damages
or the standard of care which that state's law provide [sic] for." 55 NJ. at 524, 263
A.2d at 136.
171. 508 F.2dat 36.
172. Id. at 36-37.
173. "There is no allegation that the testing in New Jersey was improperly con-
ducted. Any charge of insufficient testing would seem to relate to the place where test-
ing decisions were made, Richardson-Merrell's National I.aboratories in Ohio. New Jer-
sey was merely one of forty-one states in which clinical testing of the drug was con-
ducted." Id. at 37 (footnote omitted). All may not be lost, however, for the Henrys.
The Third Circuit suggested that Ohio, the state where the testing decisions were made,
or New York, the state of the defendant's corporate headquarters, would have an inter-
est in deterring the conduct. Id. at 34 n.14. Since Ohio has repealed its borrowing
statute (Omo Ray. CODE ANN. § 2305.20 (Page 1953) (repealed 1965)) and tolls its
statute of limitations for minors (OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.16 (Page Supp. 1975))
the Henrys may still have an opportunity for suit there. Ohio could apply its own
law under a "procedural" characterization of the statute of limitations, or by using inter-
est analysis. See Thigpen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 11 Ohio App. 179, 229 N.E.2d 107
(1967); see text accompanying notes 134-36 supra.
to drugs manufactured and tested within the forum; it is also necessary
that the decisions to manufacture and distribute the drug be made there.
This conclusion, of course, requires some study. First, one should recall
that the place of manufacture or design is normally thought irrelevant
for at least one common deterrence policy. Persons not resident in the
forum are universally allowed to recover under forum law for injuries
caused by products purchased within the forum. The "warranty" is
"breached" at the place of sale regardless of the place of manufacture,
design, or eventual injury. A New Yorker on a cross-country trip who
buys a defective product in the Midwest can recover in the state of sale
for injuries caused by the product in California. The danger to forum
residents posed by unsafe products sold in the forum is thought suffi-
cient to justify liability, and it is therefore assumed, since no forum
policy of compensation is at stake, that liability in the place of sale
affects the foreign manufacturer's foreign conduct. The question in
Henry, in which the product was not on sale in the forum, is whether a
comparable effect is produced by the threat of liability in the state of
manufacture. Suppose New Jersey now declares that its more protective
law applies in favor of anyone injured by a product made in New Jersey.
Wouldn't this decision produce a far greater deterrent effect on New
Jersey manufacturers than is now produced on non-New Jersey manu-
facturers by the application of New Jersey law only to the portion of the
latters' products sold in New Jersey?174 If Michigan adopts a strict code
of product liability and applies it to all persons injured by products
manufactured in Michigan, one can expect autos to be safer, no matter
where they are designed. The issue is not whether applying forum law
would achieve a deterrent effect, but whether the state of manufacture
should apply its own law. The latter point seems clear, and it seems
independent of where the manufacturer causes the product to be de-
signed.
Should New Jersey force its own industries to pay judgments to
strangers unprotected by other law in order to encourage compliance
with the higher standards by which New Jersey hopes to protect its own
citizens? What interest does New Jersey advance by allowing recovery
under New Jersey law to persons injured in Quebec by New Jersey
174. See, e.g., Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968). In Gaither the
District of Columbia held a District auto owner to the District's higher standard of vi-
carious liability when the owner left the keys to his station wagon in its tailgate in the
District. The thief who stole the car injured a Maryland resident in Maryland, where
the owner would not be liable, but the court allowed recovery under District law on
a deterrence theory.
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products? Could recovery be based upon the theory that a hypothetical
New Jersey citizen might have ingested thalidomide on a trip to
Quebec? In Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc.,1 75 recovery under New Jersey's
longer period was denied to a North Carolina citizen injured in North
Carolina by a product which was also on the market in New Jersey.
There was obviously a danger to New Jersey citizens if defective tires of
that brand were sold in New Jersey, and the danger was probably as
high as the danger that a New Jersey resident might ingest thalidomide
by buying it outside the United States. There remains, however, a
difference. One can assume that a certain percentage of tires of a certain
brand will be defective, and that the danger to citizens of a given state
will bear some proportion to the presence of those tires within that state.
This assumption is only a matter of statistics, however. It is entirely
possible that all the defective tires will go elsewhere and never in fact
create a danger to forum citizens. The maker of the tires can therefore
argue that his liability under the law of a state into which his products
come should be limited to compensation for injuries occurring there or
to compensation for injuries occurring elsewhere as a result of local sales
from which he receives a benefit. For injuries occurring elsewhere from
sales occurring elsewhere to persons not resident in the forum, the
manufacturer can say the forum should not impose forum law because
the degree of risk to forum residents cannot be shown. Is this rationale
also true for thalidomide? What percentage of sleeping pills containing
thalidomide poses a threat to human life? The answer is one hundred
percent, because Kevadon was specifically recommended for pregnant
women.176 This situation differs from the sale within a certain state of
Uniroyal tires, a certain percentage of which may be defective. When
every pill is defective, the human risk is so extraordinarily high that the
product can be placed in a separate class.
One now comes to the fact that thalidomide was actually given to
thirty-four women of childbearing age during the New Jersey testing
program, and the fact that an application was pending for permission to
market the drug in New Jersey as well as the rest of the United States.
What was the total danger to New Jersey citizens posed by these facts?
Was it sufficient to outweigh Quebee's possible interest in granting
repose under its shorter period to foreign corporations doing business in
175. 63 NJ. 130, 305 A.2d412 (1973).
176. Merrell's brochure is descnbed in the letter from Dr. Frances 0. Kelsey,
United States Food and Drug Administration, to Merrell, November 10, 1960. Supple-
mental Affidavit of Arthur G. Raynes, in Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 366 F.
Supp. 1192 (D.NJ. 1973).
Quebec? The risk to New Jersey families under the testing program is
obvious; the court's statement that families of forty other states were
subjected to the same risk does not diminish the risk in New Jersey.
More important, perhaps, is Merrell's pending application. If the gov-
ernment had approved it as rapidly as Merrell expected, there would
have been a major disaster throughout the United States as well as in
New Jersey. The defendant could have used the results of the New
Jersey testing in support of the application, and the adequacy of testing
would have been an important trial issue. We have seen that the state of
manufacture has more deterrent power than any other because its law
can reach every product the manufacturer makes. When one hundred
percent of a local product endangers human life, perhaps it should use
this power. If it does, it surely advances its policy of protecting people,
including forum residents, from harm. Moreover, there is a strong
chance that product safety would increase everywhere if all states so
applied their more protective laws. Does anyone know how many dan-
gerous products are now being designed, tested and manufactured? It
should not seem far-fetched to ask the state of manufacture, as well as
the state where manufacturing decisions are made, to accept responsi-
bility commensurate with its power. One is guided by language from a
court recently faced with a suit by children from ten states who were
injured by blastings caps. Their New York suit alleged that the several
manufacturers of the caps had agreed in New York to refrain from
placing any warning of danger on them. The court said:
When decisions of a tortious nature to act-or to refrain from
acting-are formulated in New York, this state's interest in the reg-
ulation of these decisions is. . . legitimate. . . . A state has some
interest in developing substantive laws insuring that it is not turned
into a den of iniquity from which wrongdoers sally forth to do mis-
chief in the land. 177
There is other recent authority for basing a deterrent policy on
conduct in the forum. In Hurtado v. Superior Court,17 the California
177. Chance v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 371 F. Supp. 439, 445 (E.D.N.Y.
1974). This language was used in discussing the issue of joint liability. The standard
of care and measure of damages, said the court, would have been governed by the place
of injury. The court did not really explain why it treated these issues differently. If
limitations had been at issue, one wonders whether the court would have found that
New York's deterrence interest varied under its borrowing statute according to the pe-
riod at each place where a child was injured. If New York has a legitimate interest
in deterring this conduct, then New York should apply all the plaintiff-protecting ele-
ments in its own law which carry that interest into effect. If it does not have such
an interest, then it should apply none of them.
178. 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 112 (1974).
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court applied California's more generous measure of damages in behalf
of a Mexican citizen wrongfully killed in California by a California
defendant. The court held:
It is manifest that one of the primary purposes of a state in creating
a cause of action in the heirs for the wrongful death of the decedent
is to deter the kind of conduct within its borders which wrongfully
takes life. It is also abundantly clear that a cause of action for
wrongful death without any limitation as to the amount of recover-
able damages strengthens the deterrent aspect of the civil sanction
.... Therefore when the defendant is a resident of California
and the tortious conduct giving rise to the wrongful death action
occurs here, California's deterrent policy of full compensation is
clearly advanced by application of its own law.'
79
A longer period of limitation should be treated the same under this
approach as a higher measure of damages; both "strengthen the deter-
rent aspect of the civil sanction." Hurtado lends considerable support to
the application of New Jersey law in Henry.5 0
Before leaving the question posed by Henry, it is necessary to ask
whether there are limits beyond which a state should not go in the
application of its deterrence policies. New Jersey has partially answered
that question in Uniroyal because it refused to apply its own law when
the product had not been locally manufactured. A clear, but common,
example of overreaching, however, is provided by Bournias v. Atlantic
Maritime Co.,' mentioned above, in which the Second Circuit applied
the forum's longer period to a claim-barred under Panamanian law-
by a Panamanian seaman against a Panamanian shipowner under the
Panama labor code. The forum in Bournias had no contact beyond its
status as the forum. Based on such a contact, the forum's only con-
ceivable policy would have been that of judicial economy. Only a
shorter period, however, expresses such a policy. A longer local period
179. Id. at 583-84, 522 P.2d at 672, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 112 (citations omitted).
180. The lower court opinion in Henry has also been discussed in a note appearing
at 49 N.Y.L. REv. 299 (1964). The author proposes four rules for applying interest
analysis to the statute of limitations which, in Henry, would have caused the court to
apply New York's period. The rationale is that New York was the defendant's princi-
pal place of business. The note does not discuss the deterrence policy expressed by
New Jersey's longer period, though this rationale has been cited frequently as a basis
for applying forum law. See also Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Milkovich v.
Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn.
376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957); Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647
(Sup. Ct. 1965), afid, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966).
181. 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955); cf. Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 182
F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950) (New Mexico applied its longer local period to a claim by
a Missouri plaintiff injured in California by a Kansas corporation).
expresses a plaintiff-protecting policy and could not possibly be relevant
when the parties, the conduct, and the relationship are all foreign. This
is "an intolerable affectation of superior virtue"' 82 by a court which has
no reason whatever to ignore the only relevant policy-that of repose-
expressed by the only interested state-Panama.
As one might expect, Bournias also raises questions of due process.
In Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,183 the Supreme Court denied Texas the
power to apply its own longer period to a contract claim in which the
only Texas contact was its status as the forum. The contract was an
insurance policy issued in Mexico by a Mexican company to a Mexican
resident for coverage of a vessel only in Mexican waters. The policy was
expressly made subject to Mexican law and contained a limitation on
time for suit which was valid in Mexico. When Texas allowed suit after
the agreed period had expired, the Supreme Court ruled that due
process was denied to the company. The only distinction between Bour-
nias and Dick seems to be that in Dick the shorter period was estab-
lished by the agreement, whereas in Bournias it was part of foreign law.
It is difficult to see any real difference between a shorter period which is
part of the foreign law and a shorter period which is agreed to in a
contract which depends upon foreign law for its legal effect. If Texas
denied due process to the defendant in Dick, the Second Circuit was
equally guilty in Bournias.1
84
One can conclude, then, that there are limits on the forum's power
to apply its own longer period. No conceivable deterrent policy of the
forum could have been applied to the facts in Bournias; the court was
able to decide the case the way it did only because it used the territorial
theory. The court was locked in the grip of the substance-procedure
distinction, which required a forum reference unless Panama's bar was
"substantive." Since Panama failed the "specificity test," the court was
left with an irrational result. The Rules suggested above would avoid
this result. Rule II requires the forum to defer to the shorter period of
the interested foreign state unless some local policy is involved. Since an
irrational forum reference is frequently required by the "procedural"
doctrine of the older theory, Rule II limits considerably the forum's
power to apply its own law. The suggested approach does, therefore,
182. Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656,
662 (1918).
183. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
184. See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests
and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Ci. L. REv. 9 (1958); in B. CURM, SELEcTED Es-
SAYS ON THE CONFLicr oF LAws 188 (1963).
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have definite boundaries. In fact, if it is followed fully one could expect
even fewer local references than under the territorial theory.
Conclusion
In conflicts between limitations, there is as much choice between
competing policies as in other types of conflicts. A court which decides a
limitations case without weighing these policies does not do so rational-
ly, and therefore does not do so justly. The idea that limitations are
"procedural," and hence outside the choice of law process, has no basis
in fact or reason and is irreconcilable with interest analysis. There is no
real difference between characterizing a problem as "procedural" and
the discredited method of characterizing it as one of "contracts" rather
than "torts." Once a court adopts interest analysis, conflicts should be
solved according to the policies which the conflicting laws express.
Borrowing statutes, which were designed to combat the procedural
characterization of limitations, are relics from the territorialist past.
They were intended to correct an abuse within the older choice of law
system, a system wholly created and maintained by the courts. As the
courts now abandon this system, they should reinterpret the statutes so
as to fit the new system of choice of law the courts are now creating. In
many states, where the statutes refer to "the place where the cause of
action arises," this result can be reached simply by giving this language
a functional definition.

